Taxation in the Global Economy by Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Taxation in the Global Economy
Volume Author/Editor: Assaf Razin and Joel Slemrod, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press, 1990
Volume ISBN: 0-226-70591-9
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/razi90-1
Conference Date: February 23-25, 1989
Publication Date: January 1990
Chapter Title: Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System
and Its Economic Premises
Chapter Author: Hugh J. Ault, David F. Bradford
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7203
Chapter pages in book: (p. 11 - 52)1  Taxing International Income: An 
Analysis of  the U.S. System 
and Its Economic Premises 
Hugh J. Ault and David F. Bradford 
International  tax  policy  has  been  something  of  a  stepchild  in  the  tax 
legislative process.  The international aspects of  domestic tax  changes are 
often considered only late in the  day  and without  full examination. As  a 
result,  the  tax  system  has  developed  without  much  overall  attention  to 
international issues. This paper is an attempt to step back and look  at the 
system that has evolved from this somewhat haphazard process. 
We  will describe in general terms the basic U.S. legal rules that govern the 
taxation of  international transactions and  explore the economic policies or 
principles they reflect. Particular attention will be paid to the changes made 
by  the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986, but  it is impossible to understand  these 
changes without placing them in  the context of  the general taxing system 
applicable  to  international  transactions.  The  first  part  (secs.  1.1  -  1.4) 
contains a description of  the legal rules, and the second part (secs. 1.5- 1.9) 
undertakes an economic analysis of  the system. We  have tried to make both 
parts intelligible to readers with either legal or economic training. 
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1.1  Basic Jurisdictional Principles 
1.1.1  Domiciliary and Source Jurisdiction 
U.S.  persons are subject to tax on a worldwide basis, that is, regardless of 
the geographic “source”  of  their income. Traditionally, this principle has 
been referred to as “domiciliary”-  or “residence”-based jurisdiction since it 
is based on the personal connection of the taxpayer to the taxing jurisdiction. 
In  contrast, foreign persons are subject to tax only on income from “U.S. 
sources”  and  then  only  on certain  categories of  income.  Individuals are 
considered U.S. persons if  they are citizens of  the United States (wherever 
resident) or if they reside there.’  Corporations are considered U.S. persons if 
they are incorporated in  the United  States. The test is purely  formal,  and 
residence of the shareholders, place of management of the corporation, place 
of business, and so forth are all irrelevant. “Foreign persons”  are all those 
not classified as U.S. persons. 
As a result of the rules outlined above, a foreign-incorporated corporation 
is treated as a foreign person even if  its shareholders are all U.S.  persons. 
The foreign corporation is taxed by the United States only on its U.S.-source 
income, and the U.S.  shareholder is taxed only when profits are distributed 
as a dividend. Thus, the U.S. tax on foreign income of  a foreign subsidiary 
is  “deferred”  until distribution to  the  U.S.  shareholder. A  special set of 
provisions introduced in 1962 and modified in 1986, the so-called Subpart F 
rules,  limits  the  ability  to  defer  U.S.  tax  on  the  foreign  income  of  a 
U. S .  -controlled foreign corporation in certain circumstances. 
This pattern of taxing rules depends crucially on identifying the source of 
income. A complex series of  somewhat arbitrary rules is used  to establish 
source. For example, income from the sale of goods is sometimes sourced in 
the country in which the legal title to the goods formally passes from the seller 
to the buyer. 
1.1.2  Overlapping Tax Jurisdiction and Double Taxation 
Where  several  countries  impose  both  domiciliary-  and  source-based 
taxation systems, the same item of income may be taxed more than once. For 
example, if  a U.S. corporation has a branch in Germany, both  the United 
States (as the domiciliary country) and Germany (as the country of  source) 
will in principle assert the right to tax the branch income. It has been the 
long-standing policy  of  the  United  States to deal with  double taxation by 
allowing  U.S.  taxpayers  to  credit  foreign  income  taxes  imposed  on 
foreign-source income against the otherwise applicable U.  S. tax  liability. 
The United States as domiciliary jurisdiction cedes the primary taxing right 
to  the  country  of  source.  Nevertheless,  the  United  States  retains  the 
secondary right to tax the foreign income to the extent that the foreign rate is 
lower  than  the  U.S.  rate.  Thus,  if  a  U.S.  taxpayer  realizes  $100  of 
foreign-source income subject to a 50 percent U.S.  rate  and a 30  percent 13  U.S. Taxation of  International Income 
foreign rate, the entire foreign tax of  $30 could be credited and a residual 
U.S. tax of  $20 would be collected on the income. If  the foreign rate were 
60 percent,  $50 of  the  $60  of  foreign taxes  would  be  creditable.  Thus, 
subject to a number of qualifications discussed below,4 the amount of foreign 
taxes currently creditable is limited to the U.S. tax on the foreign income. 
The credit  cannot offset  U.S.  taxes  on  U.S.-source  income.  If  the U.S. 
taxpayer pays “excess”  foreign taxes-that  is, foreign taxes in excess of the 
current U.S.  tax  on  the  foreign-source income-the  excess taxes can be 
carried back two years and forward five years, but they can be used in those 
years only to the extent that there is “excess limitation” available, that is, to 
the extent that foreign taxes on foreign income in those years were less than 
the U.S.  tax. In effect, the carryforward and carryback rules allow the U.S. 
taxpayer to average foreign taxes over time, subject to the overall limitation 
that the total of  foreign taxes paid in the eight-year period does not exceed 
the U.S.  tax on the foreign-source income. 
The foreign tax credit is also available for foreign income taxes paid by 
foreign corporate subsidiaries when  dividends are paid  to  U.S.  corporate 
shareholders, the so-called deemed-paid credit  .5 Thus, if a foreign subsidiary 
earns $100 of foreign income, pays $30 of foreign taxes, and later distributes 
a dividend of  $70 to its U.S. parent, the parent would include the $70 dis- 
tribution in income, “gross up” its income by the $30 of foreign tax, and then 
be entitled to credit the foreign tax, subject to the general limitations discussed 
above, in the same way as if  it had paid the foreign tax directly itself. 
It should be emphasized that the credit is limited to foreign income taxes 
and  is  not  available  for other  types  of  taxes.  The  determination of  what 
constitutes  an  income  tax  is  made  under  U.S.  standards,  and  detailed 
regulations have been issued to provide the necessary definitions (Treasury 
Regulations, sec.  1.901-2). In general, the foreign tax must be imposed on 
net realized income and cannot be directly connected with any subsidy that 
the foreign government is providing the taxpayer. Special rules allow a credit 
for gross-basis withholding taxes. 
1.1.3  Source of  Income Rules 
The source rules are central to the taxing jurisdiction asserted over both 
U. S .  and  foreign  persons.  For  foreign  persons  (including  U.  S .  -owned 
foreign subsidiaries), the source rules define the U.S. tax  base.  For U.S. 
persons, the source rules control the operation of the foreign tax credit since 
they  define  the  situations  in  which  the  United  States  is  willing  to  give 
double-tax relief.6 In general, the same source rules apply in both situations, 
though  there  are  some  exceptions.  The  following  are  some  of  the  most 
important of the source rules. 
Sale of  Property 
As a general rule,  the source of  a  gain  from the purchase and  sale of 
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sale of inventory, however, is sourced where the legal title to the good passes. 
If the taxpayer manufactures and sells property, the income is allocated by a 
formula that in effect allocates half the income to the jurisdiction where the sale 
takes place and half to the place of man~facture.~  Sales of financial assets are 
generally sourced at the residence of the seller, with an exception for the sale 
of stock in a foreign affiliate of a U.S. resident. 
Interest 
Interest received on an obligation issued by a U.S. resident (including the 
federal  government)  is  U.S.-source  income  unless  the  payor  has  derived 
more than 80 percent of its income over the last three years from an active 
foreign trade or business.  Interest paid by a foreign obligor in general has a 
foreign  source,  except  that  interest  paid  by  a  U.S.  branch  of  a  foreign 
corporation is U.S. source. In addition,  in the case of a foreign corporation 
that has 50 percent or more U.S. shareholders,8 a portion of the interest will 
be  treated  as  U.S.  source  for  foreign  tax  credit  purposes  if  the  foreign 
corporation itself has more than 10 percent of  its income from U.S. sources. 
Dividends 
All  dividends  from  U.S  .-incorporated  corporations  are  U.S.  -source 
income regardless of the income composition of the corporation.  Dividends 
paid  by  foreign  corporations  are  in  general  foreign  source  unless  the 
corporation has substantial U.S.-source business income, in which case the 
dividends  are  treated  as partially  from  U.S.  sources.'  As  in  the  case  of 
interest,  a  special  rule  preserves  the  U.S.  source  (for foreign  tax  credit 
purposes) of dividends paid by a U.S.-owned foreign corporation that itself 
has U .  S  .-source income. 
Rents and Royalties and Services 
Rents and royalties from the leasing or licensing of tangible or intangible 
property  have  their  source  where  the  property  is  used. lo If  a  transaction 
involving intangible property is treated as a sale for tax purposes, the royalty 
source  rule  applies  to  the  extent  that  any  payments  are  contingent  on 
productivity.  Services  income  has  its  source  where  the  services  are 
performed. 
The source rules put a great deal of stress on the appropriate categorization 
of a particular  item of  income.  For example, is the  granting  of  a letter of 
credit the performance  of  a service,  the  extension  of  credit, or  something 
else?" 
1.1.4  Allocation of Deductions 
The source rules apply only to establish the source of gross income. Gross 
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foreign-source income and net U.S.-source  income.  In  1977, the Treasury 
Department issued a set of specific and quite detailed rules dealing with the 
allocation of deductions (Treasury Regulations, sec.  861  -8). In general, the 
regulations  look  at  the  factual  relation  between  particular  costs  and  the 
appropriate income categories. 
Special  rules  apply  for  interest  and  for  research  and  development 
expenses. Interest is allocated on the theory that money is fungible and thus 
that interest expense should be  allocated  to all categories of  gross income 
and  apportioned  on the  basis  of  foreign and  domestic  assets. ’* Technical 
changes  in the allocation  rules made by the  1986 Act  have required  more 
interest expense of U.S. corporate groups to be allocated to foreign-source 
income, thus reducing the amount of  net foreign-source income and hence 
the ability to use foreign tax credits. l3 
Research and development costs are allocated to broad product categories 
and then apportioned in part on the basis of where the research took place 
and in part on the basis of the relative amount of sales (i.e., U.S. or foreign) 
involved.  l4 
1.1.5  Foreign-Exchange Rules 
Before  1986,  there  were  no  specific  statutory  rules  dealing  with  the 
calculation of  foreign-exchange gain or loss or the appropriate method for 
translating into dollars the gain or loss realized in transactions denominated 
in foreign currency. As a result, taxpayers had considerable flexibility in the 
treatment  of  the foreign-currency  aspects of  international  transactions.  The 
1986 Act established a fairly extensive set of rules governing these matters. 
All  U.S.  taxpayers  initially  must  establish  a  “functional  currency”  in 
which their income or loss must be calculated. The dollar is presumptively 
the  functional  currency,  but  the  taxpayer  can alternatively  establish  as  its 
functional currency for its “qualified  business units”  the currency in which 
the  unit’s  activities  are  conducted  and  in  which  its  financial  books  and 
records are kept. Thus, for example,  if a U.S. corporation has a branch in 
Switzerland and another branch in the United Kingdom, the dollar will be 
the  functional  currency  of  the  U.S.  head  office,  the  Swiss  franc  the 
functional  currency  for  the  Swiss  office,  and  the  pound  the  functional 
currency for the British office.  The Swiss and British offices will calculate 
their income initially in the appropriate functional currency, and this amount 
will  then  be  translated  into  dollars  at  an  appropriate  exchange  rate  to 
determine the  U.  S. tax  liability.  l5  For foreign-tax-credit  purposes,  foreign 
taxes  are translated  at the  rate  in effect at the  time  the taxes  are paid  or 
accrued.  l6 
The 1986 Act also provided rules for the treatment of gain or loss arising 
from certain  transactions  undertaken  by  the  taxpayer  in  a  “nonfunctional 
currency.”  Generally,  direct  dealings  in  nonfunctional  currency,  such  as 
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treated as ordinary income and has its source in the taxpayer’s country of 
residence. This means, for example, that, if a U.S. taxpayer with the dollar 
as its functional currency realizes a foreign-currency gain on the repayment 
of a foreign-currency loan, the gain will be taxable as ordinary income with 
a U.S. source. Regulations may be issued that will treat the gain as interest 
income  in  certain  circ~mstances.’~  A  special  and  complex  set  of  rules 
applies to  ‘‘hedging”  transactions involving foreign currency whereby the 
taxpayer is seeking to reduce the risk of  currency fluctuations. 
1.2  Some Aspects of the Taxation of U.S. Business 
Operations Abroad 
The following material discusses some more specific applications of  the 
general principles outlined above. The focus is on the effect of  the tax rules 
on patterns of  U.S. foreign investment. Particular reference is made to the 
1986 Act’s changes and perceived responses to those changes. 
1.2.1 
In General 
If  foreign  operations  are  undertaken  by  a  branch  (i.e.,  without  the 
interposition of  a foreign subsidiary), any income generated will be subject 
to U.S. taxation currently (with a credit for any foreign income taxes paid), 
and any foreign losses will likewise be currently deductible.  If  operations 
are carried out through a foreign subsidiary, the income will be  subject to 
U.S. tax  only  when  distributed’’  (with  a deemed-paid credit  for  foreign 
taxes), and operating losses will not be currently deductible. Before the 1986 
Act  reduction  in  U.S.  rates,  these  rules  favored  the  organization  of 
subsidiaries in those jurisdictions where the foreign effective rate was lower 
than the U.S. rate.  The potential tax  attributable to the difference between 
the U.S. rate and the foreign rate  could be  deferred until the income was 
distributed as a dividend. When U.S. rates were reduced, the advantages of 
deferral were obviously reduced.  Since most of  the tax  preferences (e.g., 
investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation) that were eliminated by  the 
1986 reform had not in any case been available for foreign income, the effect 
of  the  associated reductions in  statutory tax  rates was also to  reduce  the 
effective rate of  U.S. tax on foreign income. As a result, foreign effective 
rates in general are today in excess of  U.S. rates, and many U.S. taxpayers 
are in “excess credit”  positions. 
Despite  the  reduction  or  elimination  of  the  advantage  of  deferral  of 
income recognition, there is still a tax incentive to use foreign subsidiaries. 
If operations are in the form of a branch, the “excess”  foreign tax credits go 
into the carryforward and carryback mechanism immediately, and,  if  they 
cannot be used within the carryover period, they are lost completely. On the 
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other hand, foreign taxes paid by  a foreign subsidiary and creditable under 
the  deemed-paid rules  begin  to  toll  the  carryover period  only  when  the 
corresponding dividends are distributed. Thus, in the post-1986 world, use 
of a foreign subsidiary may allow the deferral of excess credits instead of the 
deferral of U.S. taxes. 
Subpart F 
The ability to defer current recognition of  income of  a U .  S .  -controlled 
foreign corporation (CFC) is limited by  the Subpart F provisions.*’ Income 
subject to Subpart F is in effect treated as if  it had  been  distributed as a 
dividend to the U.S. shareholder and then reinvested. A foreign tax credit is 
available  for  the  income  that  is  currently  includible;  it  parallels  the 
deemed-paid  credit  for  dividend  distributions. Later  distributions of  the 
previously taxed income can be made tax free and are “stacked”  first. 
The Subpart F rules apply to certain classes of income received by a CFC. 
In  general terms, the  rules affect dividends, interest, and  other forms of 
passive  or  investment-type income,  income  from  financial  services,  and 
income from certain dealings with related parties. The latter category covers 
situations where the foreign corporation is in effect used as a conduit to sell 
goods outside its country of  incorporation. For  example, if  a U.S.  parent 
corporation manufactures widgets with a cost of  $100 and sells them to its 
Swiss  sales  subsidiary  for  $120  (an  arm’s  length  price)  and  the  Swiss 
subsidiary sells the widgets to German customers for $150, the $30 of profit 
in the Swiss subsidiary will be taxed directly to the U.S. parent. On the other 
hand,  income  from  sales  in  Switzerland  would  not  be  taxed  currently. 
Neither  would  income  derived  by  the  Swiss  corporation  from  the 
manufacture and sale of  widgets using component parts purchased from the 
parent company.2’ Similar rules apply to the provision of services on behalf 
of related parties. The 1986 Act expanded the scope of Subpart F somewhat 
by extending the rules to financial services income and shipping income. 
Subpart F also contains rules that in effect treat as a dividend distribution 
any transaction by  a CFC that indirectly makes its earnings available to the 
U.S. shareholder. This is clearest in the case in which the CFC makes a loan 
to the U.S.  shareholder or guarantees a loan by  a third party, but  the rule 
also applies to other investments in U.S. property by the CFC. 
Note  that,  to  the  extent  that  the  objective of  Subpart  F  is  to  oblige 
companies to repatriate earnings not currently used in the active conduct of a 
business, it is not strictly sufficient to tax the passive income generated by 
earnings retained  abroad. Thus,  for example,  where a  foreign  subsidiary 
defers U.S.  tax  by  retaining  active income earned abroad  and  investing 
instead in  assets generating passive income (e.g., interest), subjecting the 
passive income to current U.S. tax is not enough to produce the equivalence 
of  repatriation of  the original active income because the passive income is 
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The role  of  Subpart F after  the  1986 Act  rate  reductions  is  somewhat 
unclear.  The provisions  were originally enacted to limit the ability to defer 
U.S.  tax through  the use of  a foreign  subsidiary where  foreign rates  were 
typically  lower  than  U.S. rates.  At  present,  however,  deferral  is  an 
advantage in only a limited number of cases. In fact, in some cases CFCs are 
intentionally  creating  Subpart F income  to use foreign  tax  credits  without 
paying the additional foreign withholding tax that would be due on an actual 
dividend distribution of non-Subpart  F income. Deferral is still significant in 
tax  haven  operations  that  slip  through  the  Subpart F  definitions  and  in 
situations  where  the  foreign jurisdiction  has  a  low  rate  of  tax  on  certain 
operations (e.g., a tax holiday in a developing country). 
1.2.2 
Background 
As  discussed in  general terms  in  section  1.1.2, the foreign  tax credit is 
limited  to the U.S. tax  applicable to foreign-source  income. But  the credit 
does  not  attempt  to  “trace”  foreign  taxes  to  particular  items  of  foreign 
income  to  determine  if  the  foreign  tax  exceeds  or  is  less  than  the 
corresponding  U.S.  tax.  Rather,  the  credit  is  limited  by  the  following 
fraction:  ((  foreign-source  taxable  income)/(worldwide  taxable  income))  X 
(U.S.  tax liability). This approach in principle allows an averaging of foreign 
taxes  where  foreign  effective  rates  are  above  and  below  U.S.  rates.  This 
means that a U.S. corporation with high-taxed  foreign-source income (e.g., 
dividends from an operating subsidiary in Germany) would have an incentive 
to create  low-taxed  foreign-source  income  to use the  excess  credits  it  has 
with  respect  to  the  high-tax  source  income.  On  the  other hand,  a  U.S. 
corporation with low-taxed foreign income is not deterred from investing in 
a  high-tax  country  since  it  can  absorb  the  high  tax  against  the  excess 
limitation created by the low-tax income and “average out” to the U.S. rate. 
Limits on Averaging 
The  1986 Act  placed  a number  of  restrictions  on the  ability  to average 
high-  and  low-taxed  foreign  income.  It  was  anticipated  that  the  rate 
reductions  would  place  many  companies  in  an  excess  credit  position  and 
would encourage them to attempt to create additional low-tax foreign-source 
income.  Accordingly,  the  Act  adopted  a  sort  of  schedular  system  that 
requires  that  foreign  income  be  classified  into  a  number  of  separate 
“baskets”  or categories and prohibits the averaging of foreign taxes across 
baskets.  Averaging  is  still  permitted  for  active  business  income  but  is 
otherwise substantially restricted. Thus, if a U.S. corporation has high-taxed 
foreign-source  manufacturing  income,  it  can  average  the  taxes  on  that 
income  with  the  taxes  on low-taxed  foreign  sales income.22 On the  other 
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hand,  it  could  not  average  high-tax  manufacturing  income  with  low-tax 
foreign-source portfolio  interest or dividend income. 
In  applying  the  basket  system,  dividends,  interest,  and  royalties  from 
CFCs  (and  amounts  subject  to  the  deemed  distributed  requirements  of 
Subpart F) are  subject  to  a  “look  through”  rule,  which  categorizes  the 
payments according to the character of the underlying  income out of which 
they  are  made.  Thus,  for  example,  interest  normally  falls  in  the  passive 
basket and cannot be  grouped with business  income.23 But  interest from a 
CFC that has only active business income would go into the business income 
basket.  A special rule places interest from export financing  in the business 
basket. Income from banking is in a separate basket and cannot be combined 
with other business income. In addition, dividends from foreign corporations 
in which the  U.S corporate  shareholder owns less than 50 percent  go in a 
separate basket “per corporation”  and cannot be used to average at all. 
Reducing Foreign Effective Rates 
A U.S. parent corporation can affect the form in which it gets its returns 
from its  foreign  subsidiaries.  These  income  flows  can  take  the  form of 
dividends on equity investment,  interest on loans, royalties  on licenses, or 
payments  for  management  services.  Payments  in  the  form  of  interest, 
royalties,  or service  fees can in  principle  reduce  the  foreign  tax  base  and 
hence the overall effective rate of foreign tax. This is true, of course, only if 
the foreign fiscal authorities accept the characterization of the payments and 
do not treat them as disguised dividend distributions.  Within certain broad 
limits,  however, a range of deductible payments  is possible.  The 1986 Act 
rate  reductions  and  the  corresponding  excess  credit  position  of  many 
companies have encouraged greater use of nondividend forms of returns that 
have the effect of reducing taxable income (and therefore tax) from the point 
of  view  of  the  foreign  jurisdiction,  but  not  of  reducing  foreign-source 
income for purposes of  calculating the creditable portion of the foreign tax. 
Under the ‘‘look through”  rule discussed above, the nondividend payments 
from a CFC still fall in the business income basket (assuming that the foreign 
subsidiary  has  active  business  income)  and  allow  the  U.S.  company  to 
reduce the overall effective foreign rate to the U.S. rate so that the foreign 
taxes are more likely to be fully creditable. 
Pooling of  Foreign Earnings 
Before the 1986 Act, the deemed-paid foreign tax credit was calculated on 
the  basis  of  an annual calculation  of  the  earnings and taxes of  the  foreign 
subsidiaries,  with  the  most  recently  accumulated  earnings  (and  associated 
taxes)  deemed  to be  distributed  first.  This procedure  gave  an incentive  to 
make dividend distributions in years in which foreign rates were high and to 
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used currently). This was especially the case in foreign systems in which the 
effective  tax  rate  could  be  substantially  influenced  by  the  taxpayer,  for 
example,  by  taking  or  not  taking  optional  depreciation  deductions.  The 
foreign subsidiary could  have an  artificially high  tax  rate in one year  by 
taking no  depreciation deductions and paying  a dividend in  that  year and 
then reducing its foreign taxes in the next year through higher depreciation 
and paying no dividend. Through a judicious use of  this so-called rhythm 
method  of  distributions,  foreign  tax  credits  could  be  accelerated  when 
compared to those that would have resulted in a level distribution of the same 
total amount. 
The  1986 Act  responded  to  this  problem  by  requiring  a  pooling  of 
earnings  for  foreign-tax-credit purposes  for  years  after  1986.  In  effect, 
foreign earnings and  taxes  are calculated on  a  cumulative rather than  an 
annual  basis  for purposes of  determining how  much  foreign tax  credit  a 
dividend distribution brings with it. 
Allocation of  Costs 
The numerator of  the foreign-tax-credit fraction is taxable foreign-source 
income. The more costs allocated to foreign-source income, the smaller the 
fraction, with  a corresponding reduction in the available credit.  The  1986 
Act  in  general requires a greater allocation of  expenses to  foreign-source 
income. In the first place, expenses (in particular, interest expense) must be 
calculated on a consolidated basis, taking into account all the members of the 
U.S.-affiliated group. Previously, interest calculations were made company 
by company. Thus, borrowing for the group could be isolated in an affiliate 
corporation  that  had  no  foreign-source  income,  and  as  a  result  the 
consolidated  taxable  foreign-source  income  of  the  group  would  not  be 
reduced  by  the  interest  expense.  Similarly,  other  expenses  could  be 
“loaded”  in  affiliates  that  had  no  foreign-source  income.  Requiring 
consolidated calculations has eliminated these manipulations. 
Summary and Evaluation 
the credit, the following operations are necessary: 
1. segregate items of  gross income into U.S.  and foreign sources; 
2. segregate foreign-source income into the appropriate categories; 
3. allocate and apportion expenses to each category; 
4.  determine the creditable foreign taxes attributable to each category; 
5. “pass  through”  these  attributes  through  the  various  tiers  of  foreign 
6. compute a separate carryover mechanism for each category. 
Even considering that the addressees of these rules are for the most part large 
multinational corporations with substantial resources and computer capacity, 
The present structure of the credit is extremely complex. In order to apply 
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one can question whether the welter of technical complexity does not try to 
fine tune the system to too great an extent. 
1.2.3  Some Specific Subsidy Provisions 
In  addition to the general structural rules outlined above, the  U.S.  tax 
system has some explicit subsidy provisions in  the international area. The 
most  important are the  rules for Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) and 
so-called possessions corporations operating in Puerto Rico. 
Foreign Sales Corporations 
Since  1971,  the  U.S.  tax  system  has  contained  several  tax  regimes 
intended to promote U.S. exports. The original provisions involved the tax 
treatment of Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCS).  In essence, 
a  DISC  is  a  paper  U.S.  company through  which  export  sales could  be 
channeled. If  the  appropriate formalities were  followed, a portion of  the 
U.S.  tax normally due on the export income could be deferred. In  1976, a 
GATT  panel  found that  the  DISC  provisions  violated  the  prohibition  on 
export subsidies, and as a result the provisions were effectively repealed in 
1984 and replaced by  the FSC rules.24 
The FSC provisions attempt to subsidize exports while at the same time 
technically complying with  the  GATT  rules.  As Congress interpreted the 
GATT  rules, an  exemption from tax on export income is not  a prohibited 
subsidy  if  the  economic  processes  that  generate  the  income  take  place 
outside  the  country  of  export.  The  FSC  rules  try  to  meet  that  test  by 
requiring that an FSC (unlike a DISC, a foreign company) have  “foreign 
management”  and engage in certain foreign a~tivities.~~  Special provisions 
in  effect  waive  the  normally  applicable  arm’s  length  pricing  rules  in 
determining  the  amount  of  income  attributable to  the  FSC  and  hence 
qualifying for the exemption. Under various complex pricing formulae, the 
overall  tax  saving  from  the  exemption  is  generally  not  more  than  5 
percentage points of  tax  on the export income. Whether the current FSC 
rules are compatible with GATT principles has not yet been determined.26 
Possessions Corporations 
In order to encourage economic development in Puerto Rico, a variety of 
tax subsidies have been offered over the years to U.S. corporations investing 
in  Puerto Rico and other U.S. possessions. In its present form, the subsidy 
consists of  a tax  credit that  in  effect eliminates the  U.S. tax  on  income 
arising in Puerto Rico. In order to qualify for the credit, the corporation must 
derive the  bulk  of  its  income  from  sources  within  Puerto  Rico  and  be 
engaged in an active trade or business there. 
Special rules apply to the income from intangibles (patents, know-how, 
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important  intercompany  pricing  issues have  involved  possessions  corpora- 
tions and the amount of intangible income appropriately allocated to them. 27 
In  1982, Congress  enacted  provisions  limiting  the  amount  of  intangible 
income that can qualify for the possessions tax credit.” 
During  the  preliminary  considerations  of  the  1986 Act,  a proposal  was 
made  to repeal  the  possessions  tax  credit  and  replace  it  with  a temporary 
(inexplicably,  in view  of  the  underlying  policy  justification  for a  subsidy) 
credit tied to the amount of wages paid in F’uerto Rico, but the proposal was 
ultimately rejected. 29 
1.3  Taxation of Foreign Persons on U.S.-Source Income 
The U.S.  system of source-based taxation is substantially less developed 
technically  than  the  system  of  domiciliary-based  taxation,  reflecting  pre- 
sumably the history of the United States as a capital exporting country. The 
system  is  essentially  schedular;  it  distinguishes  amoung  three  basic 
categories of  U.S.-source  income: investment returns  (“fixed  or determin- 
able  annual  or periodic  income”),  business  income  (income  “effectively 
connected with a U.S. trade or business”),  and capital gains. The 1986 Act 
expanded source-based taxation in several ways. It retained the prior tax rate 
on investment income received by foreign persons (while reducing domestic 
rates), limited the role of tax treaties in reducing U.S.-source-based  taxation, 
and imposed a new layer of  tax on foreign branch operations in the United 
States. 
1.3.1  Investment Income 
Investment  income  is  taxed  at  a  statutory  30 percent  gross  rate  and  is 
collected through withholding by the U.S. payor.  The rate is often reduced, 
sometimes  to  zero,  through  bilateral  income  tax  treaties  in  which  both 
contracting  states agree to a reciprocal  reduction  in  source-based  taxation. 
Representative types of income subject to the 30 percent rate are dividends, 
interest from related parties, royalties,  and rents.30 The theory of this form 
of taxation is that it is impossible administratively to calculate the deductions 
of the recipient that net-based taxation would require.  Accordingly, a lower 
gross rate of tax is applied as a surrogate for net-based taxation.  The basic 
statutory  rate  of  30  percent,  however,  was  not  changed  when  rates  on 
domestic  taxpayers  were  reduced  in  1986,  and  the  arguable  result  is 
overtaxation  of  investment  in  situations  in  which  the  30  percent  rate  is 
applicable.  31 
Several categories of investment income are exempt by statute. The most 
important  is portfolio interest,  essentially  interest paid  by  U. S. borrowers 
(including  the  U.S.  government)  to unrelated  foreign  lenders  other  than 
banks  lending  in  the normal  course of  business.32 Interest  on deposits  by 
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1.3.2  Capital Gains 
In general, capital gains are not subject to tax unless the foreign taxpayer 
is  engaged  in  a  U.S. trade  or  business  and  the  gains  are  “effectively 
connected”  with  that  trade  or  business.  Statutory  provisions  make  it 
comparatively easy for foreign investors to  avoid trade or business status for 
their stock-trading activities in the United  States unless they are dealers in 
securities with their principal office in the United States. 
Special rules apply to gains from the  sale of real  estate or the shares of 
U.S.  corporations that have substantial investments in real estate. Such gains 
are  taxed  regardless  of  whether  or not  the  foreign  investor  is otherwise 
engaged  in  a  U.S.  trade  or  business.  The  tax  is  enforced  through  a 
withholding  mechanism  that  requires  the  buyer  of  a  U.S.  real  property 
interest to withhold tax on the sale proceeds if the seller is a foreign person. 
1.3.3  Business Income 
“Normal”  business  income  of  a  U.S.  trade  or business  operated  by  a 
foreign person is taxed at the usually applicable individual or corporate rates 
on a net basis  in the same way as corresponding  income earned by  a U.S. 
taxpayer. In the case of corporations, the income is also subject to a second 
layer of tax, the so-called branch profits tax.33 Income that would usually be 
classified as investment income or capital gain is treated as business income 
if  it is deemed  to be  “effectively  connected”  with the  foreign  taxpayer’s 
U.S. trade  or business.  For  example,  interest  income  on  trade  accounts 
receivable would be taxed as business income rather than as interest income 
subject to 30  percent  gross  withholding.  Similarly, the capital  gain on the 
sale of a business asset would be taxable, but an unrelated capital gain would 
be  exempt  from  tax.  Complex  rules  define  the  line  between  effectively 
connected and non-effectively  connected income. 
1.3.4  Forms of Business Investment 
Different  patterns  of  taxation  apply,  depending  on  whether  a  foreign 
person  invests in  the  United  States through  a U.S. corporation  or directly 
through a U.S. branch.  If the investment is through a U.S. corporation,  all 
the income realized by the corporation will be subject to the normal tax rules 
applicable  to  U.S.  persons  because,  technically,  the  foreign-owned  U.S. 
corporation  is  simply  a  U.S.  taxpayer  subject  to  tax  on  its  worldwide 
income.  Dividends paid by  the U.S.  corporation to the foreign shareholder 
are  subject  to the  30  percent  gross  withholding  tax  (reduced  by  treaty). 
Interest  paid  by  the  corporation  on  shareholder  loans  is  subject  to 
withholding tax as well. The shares of the corporation could be sold without 
U.S.  tax as long as the corporate investment was not primarily in real estate. 
A sale of the assets followed by a liquidation of the corporation would result 
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If  the  foreign corporate  investor  forms a  U.S.  branch,  the  net  business 
income of the branch (and any investment-type income that was effectively 
connected)  would  be  taxed  at  normal  U.S.  rates.  Deductions  would  be 
allocated to the U.S. operations under roughly the same rules that are used to 
make  similar allocations  for purposes  of  the  foreign-tax-credit  fraction.  In 
addition,  to the extent that the branch  did not reinvest  its net profit  in the 
U.S.  branch  operation,  a  second  level  of  tax  would  be  imposed  on the 
corporate  profits.  This  “branch  profits  tax,”  enacted  by  the  1986 Act,  is 
intended to replicate the shareholder-level dividend tax that would have been 
applicable if the investment had been made through a U.S. corporation that 
then distributed its net profit as a dividend. The branch analog to a dividend 
distribution is the failure to reinvest the branch profits in the U.S. business. 
Thus, if a foreign-owned U.S. subsidiary has $100 of pretax profit and pays 
$34 of corporate level tax, a distribution of the $66 after-tax profit would be 
subject to the dividend withholding tax.  Similarly, if  the U.S. branch of a 
foreign corporation has $100 of pretax profit and does not reinvest the $66 of 
after-tax  profit  in  the  U.S.  business,  the  branch  profits  tax  would  be 
applicable.  If the branch profits tax has been avoided in past years through 
reinvestment  and  in  a  subsequent  year  the  U.S. business  investment  is 
reduced, the tax becomes due at the time of disinvestment. 
The branch  profits  tax replaced  a  largely ineffective  withholding  tax  on 
dividend distributions by foreign corporations with substantial U.S. business 
income.  It represents a more serious attempt to establish the U.S. claim to 
two levels of source-based taxation on U.S  .-generated corporate profits. The 
treaty aspects of  the branch profits tax are discussed below. 
1.4  Other International Aspects of the 1986 Act 
1.4.1  Transfer Pricing for Intangibles 
Under section 482, the income arising out of  transactions between related 
parties  must  be  determined  on an “arm’s  length”  basis, that  is, as if  the 
various parties  were not related.  Thus, if  a U.S. parent sells manufactured 
products to a foreign subsidiary, the price charged (which will determine the 
amount  of  income  that  the  United  States will  tax  currently  to the  parent) 
must be that which would have been charged to an unrelated third party. The 
same principles apply to sales by a foreign parent to its U.S. subsidiary.  In 
the  absence of  any comparable  third-party  sales, regulations  provide  for a 
number  of different  methods  for constructing  an  appropriate  intercompany 
price.  In practice,  these rules have been  very  hard  to administer  and  have 
resulted  in  extensive  administrative  and  judicial  disputes.  Problems  have 
arisen, in particular, with the transfer and licensing of intangibles. 
In response to these difficulties, Congress in 1986 amended section 482 as 
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transfer or license of an intangible, “the income with respect to such transfer 
or  license  shall  be  commensurate  with  the  income  attributable  to  the 
intangible.” This language was intended to mandate an approach that looks 
to the actual profit  generated by  the  intangible and the relative economic 
contribution that each of the related parties involved has made to the income 
that has been generated. The “commensurate with income”  standard applies 
to all intangible transactions, but it was particularly aimed at the transfer of 
intangibles with a high profit potential, so-called crown jewel intangibles. 
A  congressionally  mandated  Treasury  Department  study  (1988bthe 
“White Paper”-has  been issued in connection with the 1986 Act change in 
the treatment of  intangibles. It contains an extensive analysis of  the issues 
involved in developing the commensurate-with-income standard. The White 
Paper starts from the premise that, if  an “exact comparable”  in fact exists, 
an arm’s length price should be based on that comparable. That comparison 
gives the best evidence of  what unrelated parties  would have done in  the 
situation under examination. If,  as generally will be  the case, there is no 
exact comparable,  several alternative approaches are suggested. One is to 
attempt to  find  an  “inexact  comparable,”  one  that  differs  in  significant 
respects  from  the  intangible  transaction  in  question,  and  then  to  make 
appropriate adjustments. The White Paper, although it in general accepts the 
principle of  looking to inexact comparables, finds that in the past their use 
has led to  “unpredictable outcomes”  and downplays such comparisons. It 
stresses instead a method that looks to arm’s length rates of return rather than 
arm’s length prices. 
The arm’s length rate of  return method begins by  identifying the assets 
and other factors of production the related parties will be using in the line of 
business in which the intangible will be used. This determination involves a 
functional analysis of the business. Then a market rate of return is assigned 
to each of  the identified functions, based on the rates of return in unrelated 
transactions. This analysis will give the appropriate amount of  the income 
generated in  the line of  business that is attributable to all the quantifiable 
factors  of  production.  All  the  remaining  income  is  allocated  to  the 
intangible.  For  example,  assume  that  P  has  developed  a  patent  for  the 
manufacture of  a product that will be manufactured under a license by  an 
affiliate. The transaction will generate $500 of income, and, at a market rate 
of  return  on  the  tangible assets involved,  $300  of  the  income would  be 
allocated to the tangible assets. The remaining $200 would be allocated to 
P’s intangible as the commensurate amount of intangible income. 
The example above assumes that  the manufacturing intangible was  the 
only intangible involved in the line of  business and that the returns on the 
tangible assets could be determined. In more complex cases where both of 
the related parties have intangibles, for instance, where the foreign affiliate 
has marketing intangibles, the White Paper approach is to apply the arm’s 
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income based on the relative values of the intangibles involved. Thus, in the 
example above, the residual $200 of income would be split in some fashion 
between  the  manufacturing  intangible  and  the  marketing  intangible.  The 
White Paper recognizes that “splitting of  intangible income . . . will largely 
be a matter of  judgment”  (U.S. Treasury Department  1988, 101). Never- 
theless, some guidance may be got  from unrelated  parties that  use  similar 
intangibles. 
The legislative history of the  1986 changes in the treatment of intangibles 
indicates  that  the  income  from  the  intangible  subject to  allocation  under 
section  482  should  reflect  the  “actual  profit  experience  realized  as  a 
consequence of  the  [license  or  tran~fer].”~~  The  White  Paper  takes  the 
position that this language justifies periodic adjustments to intangible returns 
to reflect changes in levels of profits that occur after the original transaction. 
Such periodic adjustments  will be required only in situations in which third 
parties dealing at arm’s length would have normally  included provision  for 
them. In practice, this may mean that licenses for “normal”  intangibles will 
not  be  subject  to periodic  adjustment  but  that  such adjustment  would  be 
required  in  situations  involving  intangibles  with  unusually  high  profit 
potential. 
1.4.2  Tax Treaties 
As  indicated  above,  bilateral  income  tax  treaties  can  affect  the  basic 
pattern of domestic taxing rules. In general, the treaties typically do not have 
any effect  on the U.S.  taxation  of  U.S. persons  but  may  reduce  the taxes 
imposed  by  the  source  country  treaty  partner.  This  will  be  especially 
significant in the future, when many U.S. taxpayers will be in excess credit 
positions.  The treaty  may  also provide that  a  foreign  tax  that  might not 
otherwise be creditable as an income tax will qualify for the credit. 
For foreign persons, the treaties can reduce the U.S. source-based tax that 
would normally be applicable.  For example, many treaties eliminate the 30 
percent tax on nonportfolio interest entirely  and reduce the dividend  tax  to 
15 or 5 percent in the case of parent-subsidiary  dividends. Treaties may also 
prevent the imposition of the 1986 branch profits tax. Most treaties contain a 
so-called nondiscrimination clause, under which the United States agrees not 
to subject foreign persons to taxation  “more burdensome” than the taxation 
imposed on similarly situated U.S. persons.  As described above, the branch 
profits tax is imposed on foreign corporations doing business  in the United 
States but not on U.S. corporations. This difference in treatment is viewed as 
violating  nondiscrimination  clauses  and  prevents  the  application  of  the 
branch tax in many treaty  situation^.^^ 
A number of recent treaties contain provisions  to prevent so-called treaty 
shopping, that  is, the use of  a  treaty  country corporation  by  third-country 
investors to obtain a reduction in U.S. source-based taxation that they could 
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treaty) between their country and the United  States. In  addition, the  1986 
Act  specifically  denied  treaty  benefits  in  some  circumstances  to  foreign 
corporations that are treaty   hop ping.^' In particular, treaty-shopping foreign 
corporations are prohibited from claiming relief from the branch profits tax 
under a treaty nondiscrimination clause. 
1.5  Recapitulation of Present Policy 
The tax treatment of international income flows reflects a variety of policy 
objectives,  so it  is  difficult  to  discern the  policy  principles in  the  actual 
rules-to  state the optimizing problem to which the rules are the solution.38 
Broadly  speaking, though,  the regime for taxing  international transactions 
can  be  understood  as  springing  from  a  fundamental principle  that  U.S. 
citizens and residents should be taxed on all their income. Coupled with this 
basic  premise,  in  a multijurisdictional system, is the principle that  people 
should  not  be  taxed  twice  on  the  same  income.  Both  principles  reflect 
notions of equity. The first reflects the conception of income as a measure of 
ability to pay-since  the source of income has no bearing on its validity as a 
measure of  ability to pay,  the tax burden  should be  based on “worldwide 
income.”  But  the  tax  burden  is  not  simply  imposed  by  the  home 
government; if two people with the same income are to pay the same tax, the 
amount extracted by  a foreign jurisdiction must be counted equally with that 
taken by the home government. 
These simple and  superficially plausible normative conclusions are but- 
tressed  by  a  similarly plausible efficiency criterion,  that  of  capital export 
neutrality. A nation’s tax rules satisfy capital export neutrality if the choice of 
a domestic taxpayer between foreign and domestic investment is unaffected 
by tax considerations and depends only on the relative level of before-tax rates 
of return. Of course, an efficiency criterion is itself at heart an expression of 
an equity objective, that of maximizing the size of the economic pie. If all the 
tax authorities in the international system adhere to export tax neutrality, a 
perfectly  competitive international capital market  will  leave no gain from 
reallocation of  (any given stock of) world capital unexploited. 
In the context of  real-world politics and practical tax administration, the 
two foundation stones of  U.S. international income tax policy, taxation on 
the basis of  worldwide income and capital export neutrality, give rise to a 
continually evolving set of rules. The most recent version has been described 
in secs. 1.1 -  1.4. Much as we can think of the domestic personal income tax 
as an  accretion income tax  with certain exceptions and the basic corporate 
tax  as  a  “classical”  second-level  tax  on  corporations,  we  can  broadly 
describe the current treatment of  international business as follows: 
1. U.S.  corporations  are  taxed  on  their  income  wherever  earned.  The 





foreign company (even a controlled subsidiary) is basically interpreted as 
the  dividends  received,  when  received.  Hence,  there  is  “deferral”  of 
U.S. tax until repatriation. 
Sovereign governments have the first claim to tax income created within 
their borders.  This principle applies to the taxation of  U.S. corporations 
operating abroad and to foreign corporations operating in the United States. 
To  alleviate  the  “double  taxation”  of  income  arising  from  activities 
abroad, the United States allows U.S. taxpayers to credit foreign income 
taxes paid against their U.S. tax liabilities. The foreign tax credit should 
not  be  seen  to reduce  the  tax  on income  created  by  a company  in the 
United States; hence, the credit is limited to the amount of U.S. tax that 
would have been collected on the foreign income. U.S. companies should 
not  be  inhibited  by  tax  considerations  from  using  foreign  subsidiary 
corporations  to  do  business  abroad.  Therefore,  a  credit  against  U.S. 
income tax  is allowed  to U.S. corporate  shareholders  for foreign  taxes 
actually paid by foreign corporations. 
Certain  payments  to  foreigners  (mainly  dividends  and  interest)  are 
subjected to a withholding tax that mimics the tax that would be paid by 
a U.S. individual recipient. The withholding tax is eliminated or reduced 
mutually by bilateral  treaty agreement with other governments. 
Certain  tax  rules  are  intended  to  encourage  investment  in  the  United 
States (now, mainly,  accelerated depreciation).  Generally, these rules do 
not apply to investment abroad. 
As  the discussion of the legal rules in secs.  1.1 -  1.4 makes clear, imple- 
menting  these  general  principles  is  far from straightforward.  The present 
system  is  the  result  of  a  long process  of  successive  “loophole  closing” 
efforts, as the tax  policy  makers have discovered one way after another in 
which  taxpayers (or foreign governments)  can organize their affairs to take 
advantage of the U.S. rules.  The 1986 changes are the latest  in the series, 
with  particular  attention  to the  implications  of  the  substantial  lowering  of 
U.S. tax rates incorporated in the reform. 
The thrust of the 1986 changes with respect to U.S. firms operating abroad 
was to scale back deferral through expansion of the Subpart F provisions that 
require immediate taxation of “tainted”  forms of income, to limit further the 
creditability of foreign taxes through wider use of  “baskets”  of  income by 
type, and to reduce the relative attractiveness of domestic investment through 
elimination  of  the  investment  tax  credit  and  slowdown  of  depreciation 
allowances. 
With respect to foreign firms operating in the United States, the 1986 Act 
introduced  a  branch  profits  tax,  whose  objective  was  to  put  branches  of 
foreign  corporations  and  U.S.  subsidiary  corporations  of  foreign  corpora- 
tions on a more similar footing.  The branch  profits  tax  corresponds  to the 
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shareholders. For foreign firms, the second main thrust of  the 1986 changes 
was the consequence of  not changing the rate of withholding tax at the same 
time domestic rates were being  cut; the effect was to the disadvantage of 
foreign relative to domestic ownership.39 
1.6  Do the Bricks Lack Straw? 
Before we turn to some of the more specific policy issues raised by these 
rules, it may be useful to devote a bit of  critical attention to the two basic 
building blocks of worldwide taxation and the foreign tax credit. 
1.6.1  Worldwide Taxation 
The argument underlying the principle of worldwide taxation-taxation  of 
income from whatever source-appears  to be motivated by  a conception of 
income as a given attribute of  an  individual or a firm. If  A and B have the 
same income, they should pay the same tax. But income for tax purposes is 
not an abstract flow. Rather, it is an accounting construct built up by adding 
and  subtracting amounts paid  and  received  (or accrued,  to  make  matters 
worse).  The  banal  fact  that  an  income  tax  is  based  on  transactions 
(admittedly, the transactions are sometimes subjected to very  complicated 
transformations) has destructive implications for the equity case often made 
for tax rules. It also has profound implications for tax design, implications 
that have as yet been only partially digested in academic economic thinking 
and that are only beginning to be felt in the making of tax policy. 
The equity proposition that it is unfair for two people with equal incomes 
to pay different amounts in tax would perhaps be persuasive if income were 
an  attribute  with  which  an  individual  is  endowed.  But  it  is  generally 
fallacious when income is an aggregation of transactions entered into by the 
taxpayer. To  take an obvious example, if two people have the same amount 
of  money  to  invest,  it  is  of  no  equity  consequence  that  one  chooses 
tax-exempt bonds and pays no tax and the other chooses taxable bonds and 
pays tax. Since either could make the same choice as the other, no inequity 
can be said to result from the fact that they send different amounts of money 
to the tax collector.40 
Equity arguments based on the view of  income as an exogenous attribute 
are particularly misleading in the context of  capital markets. In part, this is 
because  the  opportunities  of  participants  are  to  a  considerable  degree 
unrelated to a meaningful measure of their ability to pay:  people differ in 
their wages but not in the rate of interest that they can earn on savings. More 
important,  as  the  tax-exempt interest example illustrates,  is  the  fact that 
determining the actual tax burdens (in economists’ jargon,  the incidence of 
taxes) requires a difficult analysis of the effect of the rules in the context of 
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taxpayer  at  all  margins  of  choice.  In  capital  markets,  those  margins  are 
extraordinarily varied and simultaneously available to many participants. 
The more profound consequence of the view of income as an aggregation 
of  transactions is to place  income tax policy  in the framework  of  taxes on 
transactions more generally.  The more complex uses  of  transaction  data in 
the  income tax  context concern  purchases  and  sales of  claims on goods  at 
different times or under different contingencies.  In mundane terms, the hard 
part  of  income  taxation  is  to  use  transactions  to  measure  “income  from 
capital.”  But, when these transactions are viewed  like other purchases and 
sales of goods, the case for employing the peculiarly  complex procedures of 
income accounting (rather than much more simple rules) in order to achieve 
various  equity  objectives  becomes  much  less  clear  than  it  appears  when 
income is viewed as an abstract attribute. A striking instance of how little it 
is  recognized  that  an  income  tax  consists  of  a  collection  of  taxes  on 
transactions  is the  almost  total  lack  of  connection  between  the  making  of 
international  income  tax  policy  and  the  making  of  international  trade 
policy.4’ 
1.6.2  Credit for Foreign Income Taxes 
Recognizing  that  an  income  tax  is  levied  on  the  basis  of  voluntary 
transactions, not exogenously determined attributes of  individuals and firms, 
upsets the equity argument for crediting foreign income taxes as well. At first 
glance, if  A and B have the  same income but  B is subjected to a foreign 
income tax, it seems fair to allow B’s foreign tax to count against an overall 
burden.  But, if  B’s wealth  can alternatively be allocated between a foreign 
asset and a domestic one, it is clear that allowing or not allowing a credit for 
the foreign tax will affect the location of B’s wealth,  not B’s tax burden. 
1.7  International and Foreign Transactions in a System of Accretion 
Income Accounting 
The traditional literature on income taxation begins with  a discussion  of 
the accretion income concept, generally known in the jargon of the trade as 
Haig-Simons  or  Schanz-Haig-Simons  (SHS)  income.42  SHS  income  is 
defined to be the sum of consumption and the change in net worth (at market 
value) of a person over some specified period. A natural question is how the 
rules  relating  to  international  income  relate  to  this  fundamental  income 
notion. 
1.7.1 
Accounting for Personal Income 
The idea that income has a locatable source seems to be taken for granted, 
but  the  source of  income  is  not  a  well-defined  economic  idea.  The  SHS 
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definition describes a quantity that is, in principle, measurable, whatever the 
practical problems may be (and they are substantial). The emphasis placed 
by  tax reform advocates on the objective of taxing income “from whatever 
source” has obscured the fact that the SHS income concept is not susceptible 
to characterization  as to source at all. Income in this definition attaches to 
someone or something that consumes and that owns assets. Income does not 
come  from  some  place,  even  though  we  may  construct  accounts  to 
approximate  it  by  keeping  track  of  payments  that  have  identifiable  and 
perhaps  locatable  sources  and  destinations.  To  the  extent  that  income 
describes an activity, it is not that of production but that of consumption and 
wealth accumulation, and its location is presumably the place of residence of 
the person doing the consuming and accumulating. 
Naturally, calling a tax an income tax does not imply that it will or should 
embody the SHS norm. The fact is, however, that something like the SHS 
income  norm  does  appear  to  motivate  much  of  the  U.S.  system.  More 
important,  the  objective  of  increasing  wealth  is  rather  persuasively  the 
motivator of investment decisions. Large changes in  wealth occur continu- 
ally by virtue of changes that have no natural locational aspect. Examples are 
the  discovery  of  a new drug formula or new consumer good.  Even  more 
significant are simple changes in expectations and beliefs about the future, 
which  can  result  in  large  changes in  asset  values.  Attaching  locations  to 
these  phenomena  inevitably  involves  arbitrary  line  drawing,  with  its 
attendant  controversy.  (See  the  discussion  in  secs.  1.1 -  1.4 of  transfer 
pricing of intangibles.) 
The view of  income as a payment  for factor services (rather than as the 
sum  of  saving  and  consumption)  may  appear to  offer  a  firmer  basis  for 
attribution of source. The reasoning that leads to an SHS concept, however, 
emphasizes  that  the  payment  actually  received  by  a  person  has  to  be 
interpreted in terms of some notion of accruing benefit. In crude terms, the 
normative  notion  of  income  must  be  net  of  the  “costs  of  earning”  any 
payments.  That  is  why  is  seems  correct  to  deduct  employee  business 
expenses from wages; the same line of argument may justify a deduction for 
medical  expenses  as well  (they  do not  buy  consumption  in  a  normative 
sense). 
As  we  have  emphasized,  an  income  tax  in  practice  is built  up  from 
transactions. It would be very difficult to construct a system of accounts that 
would give a close approximation to SHS income. Actual income accounts 
do not  even attempt.it. When  one then  adds the  necessity  of  attaching  a 
locational label to the transactions, an operation that is not itself based on a 
well-defined  economic  question,  complexity  and  arbitrariness  are  hard  to 
avoid. 
In many cases, amounts paid and received can be rather readily given a 
location  by  association  with a process  of  production or similar activity. A 
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monitoring by a particular local jurisdiction and thereby becomes a potential 
basis for taxation. The association is so obvious that it is apparently taken for 
granted that a government has the “right”  to levy a tax based on a measure 
of the profits earned by a production activity physically carried on within its 
jurisdiction. One may speculate that force majeure has been as important as 
any ethical conception of sovereignty in producing  a general acceptance of 
the priority of the “source” jurisdiction to tax particular transactions. 
Income of  a Corporation 
For a corporation, the analog of personal consumption is distributions to 
shareholders. The corporation tax treatment of particular transactions, such 
as receipt of a dividend or of the proceeds of the sale of an asset, has to be 
understood as a piece of a system of accounts designed to capture the sum of 
distributions to shareholders and increase in net worth. A dividend, itself, is 
not SHS income; it may be used to measure income, but, if  the change in 
value of the stockholder’s remaining claim on the corporation is ignored, the 
accounts will produce a bad approximation to SHS income (Bradford 1986, 
chap. 3). The defective accounts will either over- or understate the taxpayer’s 
SHS income; typically, such mismeasurement  sets up opportunities for tax- 
motivated  arbitrage with balancing  transactions  that  involve  different  mis- 
measurement. 
The economist is struck by the frequency with which one encounters in the 
law legal and institutional distinctions without an economic difference. As a 
result,  the  rules  frequently  prescribe  different  tax  consequences  for 
economically equivalent (or nearly  equivalent)  transactions.  Where this is 
the  case,  there  is an  opportunity  for arbitrage  profit.  The  efforts  of  the 
policymakers  to  limit  arbitrage  profit  (without  actually  instituting  consis- 
tency) have much to do with the evolution of the rules. 
As  a  simple example,  consider  the  distinction  between  distributed  and 
undistributed earnings of a wholly owned foreign subsidiary. In one case, the 
sub sends the parent a dividend. In the second case, the sub simply retains 
the earnings but lends the parent money. The bundle of real claims owned by 
the parent is the same after the transactions are completed in both cases. Yet 
before  1962 the tax  results  were  very  different.  It  then  might  have made 
sense  for  the  sub never  to  pay  the  parent  a  dividend  since  the  exactly 
equivalent cash flow could have been effected with a lower tax penalty by 
the lending route. The policy response: a rule treating loans to the parent as 
dividends and a series of subrules dealing with transactions similar to loans, 
for example, the sub’s guarantee of  a loan to the parent. 
This is an example of  the problems  created  by inconsistency  of  the tax 
treatment of transactions with similar economic effects. Such inconsistency 
is ubiquitous in the implementation of the income tax. Although the point is 
a simple one and even well known, it is still insufficiently appreciated  by 
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treatment for economically equivalent results is  severe in  the  case of  an 
income  tax,  basically  because  of  the  difficulty  of  measuring  accruing 
changes in  value.  These difficulties are compounded when the ill-defined 
criterion of  location of  income is added.43 
1.7.2  Deduction or Credit for Foreign Taxes? 
Discussions of  the  foreign tax  credit  are often cast  in  a  framework in 
which the tax at issue is on the capital income of domestic residents. Viewed 
as  an  element of  a  set  of  accounting rules  to  approximate the  sum  of  a 
person’s  consumption  and  increase  in  net  worth  during  the  period,  the 
foreign tax credit makes little sense. True, the payment of  taxes might be 
regarded as  a use  of  buying power that is not  consumption (although the 
point is arguable; see Bradford et al.  1984), and it certainly is not evidence 
of  an increase in net worth.  But SHS income tax principles would seem to 
imply, at most, deductibility of  taxes paid to other jurisdictions by  persons 
otherwise regarded as within the income tax net. 
1.8  Economic Analytical Problems Posed by Actual Policies 
In the discussion of the economics of the international tax rules so far, we 
have attempted to relate them to philosophical objectives. We  turn now to 
economic issues more directly related to the actual system as it has evolved. 
1.8.1 
Most economic modeling related to international tax policy assumes that 
the implementation problems have been  solved. Specifically, analysts take 
for granted the existence of a measurable quantity called capital (K)  that can 
be  located in a particular country and  whose ownership can be observed. 
Also assumed observable is the measurable return (rK) accruing to capital in 
each country. As  we have emphasized, actual tax rules depend on a variety 
of observable transactions, none of which corresponds neatly to the accruing 
return on capital.44 Before we turn to a closer look at problems associated 
with  particular aspects of the rules,  however,  we  may note a troublesome 
problem of consistency that is likely to present itself quite apart from matters 
of  definition and measurement. This problem,  which has been emphasized 
by  Slemrod (1988), can be described as one of  tax harmonization. It arises 
when the tax rules applied by  different countries to  investors in  different 
countries are not appropriately coordinated. 
We  can best express this problem in a setting in which risk  is assumed 
away  and  investors  are  indifferent  between  returns  arising  in  different 
countries (no bias toward returns in one’s own country). Then investors will 
move  their capital around to  achieve the highest return  after all taxes.  A 
condition  of  equilibrium  is  that  the  rate  of  return  after  all  taxes  be 
simultaneously equal  in  all  countries for  residents  of  each country.  In  a 
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two-country case, let rd be the domestic rate of return before taxes and rf the 
return  in  the  foreign  country.  Let  fuk  be  the  tax  levied  by  country  i  on 
investors resident  in country j on returns to capital they  own in country k, 
where  i, j,  and  k  can be either d  (domestic) or f  (foreign).  Then there are 
eight possible  tax rates.  If  we  rule out the taxation  by  one country  of the 
income of residents of the other country earned on capital in that country (fdf 
and qdd  are  zero), there  are  six  tax  rates.  If  domestic  investors  are to be 
indifferent between investing at home and abroad, it must be true that 
Similarly, in order for foreigners to be indifferent between investing in their 
own country and abroad, it must be true that 
Taking the ratio of the two conditions,  we see that together they imply 
This is one condition on six tax rates.  The difficulty is that there is very 
little assurance that it will be satisfied by the rules chosen by any given pair 
of countries (much less that the corresponding generalization will be satisfied 
for  various  pairwise  linkings  of  several countries).  If  the  condition  is not 
satisfied,  one  or the  other after-tax  equalization  condition  must  fail.  The 
difficulty that this failure creates for economic modeling is clear (we would 
say that the markets have no equilibrium),  but the world was not created to 
satisfy the modelers.  Actually, some process will balance the demands and 
supplies-probably  some combination  of  transactions  cost, nonlinearity  of 
the tax rates  (e.g., the nonlinearity that results from the fact that taxes are 
nonrefundable),  and special “patches”  in the tax rules designed to limit the 
arbitrage between more and less favorable  jurisdiction^.^^ 
1.8.2  Incentives for Business Location: Form  and Substance 
Place of residence  and  even citizenship  are choices. Since the  U.S. tax 
laws make distinctions on the basis of place of residence and citizenship, we 
may expect the laws to influence the choices.  Clearly, in exceptional cases 
(movie  stars, for instance),  taxes  influence people’s  domicile  and  citizen- 
ship.  But  for most  people,  in  the  range  of  tax  regimes  that  is  typically 
encountered,  we expect little elasticity of domicile or citizenship to changes 
in tax policy, and therefore distinctions based on residence of people will be 
of a lump-sum character. 
One might  expect the choice of place of incorporation to be much more 
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between  U.S. and  foreign  corporations must  have  effects,  either  on  the 
choices or  on  the rules  enacted (having  in  mind  their effect on  place of 
incorporation). If the people choosing the location of incorporation are U.S. 
taxpayers  and  they  want  to  be  able  to  control  the  management  of  the 
operation located abroad,  they  have two basic options: to  incorporate (or 
even not incorporate but operate in noncorporate form) in the United States 
and  run  the  foreign  activity as  a  branch  or  to  incorporate abroad  while 
maintaining significant ownership interest. These two forms of  organization 
are  economically  virtually  equivalent.  In  addition,  there  are  such  less 
perfectly  substitutable alternatives as a noncontrolling interest in  a foreign 
corporation  (‘‘portfolio  investment”)  and  royalty  and  similar  contingent 
claims.  Note  that  a  capital  market  “imperfection”  is  implicit  in  the 
observation that  one  cannot  create  a  perfect  substitute  for  a  controlling 
interest  through  an  appropriate  combination  of  available  securities.  A 
controlling  interest  in  a  corporation  could  presumably  in  principle  be 
reproduced by a sufficiently complicated contract that could be marketed as a 
portfolio  security.  The  cost  of  writing  and  monitoring  such  contracts  is 
required for a distinction between controlling and portfolio investment. 
The basic policy toward residence of  corporations is an extension of  the 
legal doctrine that the corporation is a separate person. A corollary of  the 
distinction between  U.S.  and foreign persons is the deferral of  tax  on the 
earnings of  foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. For U.S. corporations 
that  own  other  U.S. corporations,  the  tax  accounts  are  consolidated. 
Dividends passing from the sub to the parent have no tax consequences. By 
the same logic, dividends paid from one company to another ought not to be 
taxed  when  both  corporations are separately U.S. taxpayers but  not  in  a 
relation of  parent  and sub. (In fact, a fraction of  dividends received by  a 
U.S. corporation from another U.S. corporation, other than a controlled sub, 
is  included in  the recipient’s tax base.  The fraction was  increased by  the 
1986 Act.) 
In  the  case of  a subsidiary that  is  not  a U.S. taxpayer,  the policy  that 
springs from the treatment of  a corporation as a person is to tax the parent 
only on “income”  as measured by dividends, that is, in the cash flow sense 
of  income  often  encountered  in  the  U.S. income  tax.  No  one  suggests 
‘  ‘integrating”  corporate  and  shareholder income  accounts in  the  case  of 
portfolio investment, so deferral,  which  is  a much  debated policy,  might 
seem a sensible way of avoiding a sharp break in tax treatment at the point at 
which  the  shareholder’s interest  is  regarded  as  crossing the  boundary  to 
“control.”  The main effect, however, of  this extension of  the metaphor of 
corporation as person  and of  the use of  dividends as a measure of  income 
arises precisely with  control because the  policy  puts  a  great deal  of  tax 
weight  on  a  decision  that  is  under  the  U.S.  taxpayer’s  control.  In  this 
connection, the critical choice is probably not between retention of funds and 
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dividends  and  distribution  in  other  forms,  such  as  share  repurchase, 
royalties, favorable loan terms, or manipulation of other intercompany prices 
(“transfer prices”). 
1.8.3  The Foreign Tax Credit as an Implicit International Agreement 
As has been mentioned, the creditability of foreign income taxes is usually 
justified  on  the  equity  grounds  of  avoiding  double  taxation  and  on  the 
efficiency  grounds  of  capital-export  neutrality,  which  requires  that  taxes 
should not influence the country of location of capital. The credit is supposed 
to make U.S. tax burdens independent of the location of investment, thereby 
assuring that a U.S. firm will not be influenced in its investment decisions by 
differences between U.S. and foreign taxes. 
It is difficult to construct an optimizing model from a national perspective 
that  implies capital-export  neutrality,  even if  it could  be  achieved  without 
sacrificing  revenue  to  foreign  governments.  Optimal  tariff  considerations 
(whereby  a  large  country  seeks  to  exploit  its  monopoly  advantage  by,  in 
effect, raising  the  prices  of  its  exports and  forcing down  the  prices  of  its 
imports  through  the  use  of  tariffs)  would  generally  imply  that  foreign 
investment  should  be  discouraged  relative  to  the  level  implied  by 
unobstructed competitive capital markets.46 It is even more difficult to justify 
crediting  taxes  paid  to  foreign  governments  as  a  method  of  achieving 
capital-export neutrality,  as long as the policies of foreign governments are 
taken as given.  The reason is simple.  The foreign government  collects the 
taxes on the investment. The yield to the domestic economy is net of foreign 
tax,  whereas  the  yield  of  domestic  investment  is  gross  of  domestic  tax. 
National  self-interest  would  seem  to  imply  something  like  deduction  of 
foreign taxes. 
It is a serious error, though,  to view  the choice of policy as made in an 
international  vacuum.47 Since the tax policy of  foreign governments cannot 
be taken  as a given, an analysis of  the  national  interest  that neglects their 
reactions is fundamentally  flawed.  Like free trade,  capital-export  neutrality 
has to be understood as an international discipline or standard that may leave 
all participants  better  off  than  they  would  be  under  likely  noncooperative 
 alternative^.^^ That is, a policy  of capital-export  neutrality  by all countries 
may lead to an outcome that is better for all than would obtain if policy were 
made separately on the assumption of no foreign interactions. 
Unfortunately, this hypothetical possibility is merely that. The suggested 
policy that makes the economic pie as big as possible  (and note that, since 
the  taxes  affect  the  level  as well  as the  allocation  of  capital, there  is  no 
assurance that  universal  capital-export  neutrality  would  be  better  than, for 
example, no taxation  of capital) also affects who gets what part of  the pie. 
Characteristically of efficiency rules in general, capital-export neutrality as a 
desideratum  of  policy  makes  no  reference  to  who gets  what  share of  the 
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We have described above the equity principle that it is unfair to tax income 
that  has  already  been  subjected to  tax.  This may  be  called the  “intrana- 
tional”  equity principle in that it concerns fair treatment of  two apparently 
similarly situated U.S. taxpayers. As has been emphasized, if we put to one 
side issues of transitional incidence (thereby probably putting aside the bulk 
of  tax  politics),  the  argument  for  the  foreign  tax  credit  based  on  the 
individual  equity  principle  is  surely  fallacious.  It  is  a  condition  of 
equilibrium that investors obtain the same rate of return after all taxes at all 
margins of  investment. It therefore cannot be  inequitable to subject certain 
forms of  investment to  higher or  lower rates of  tax,  although it  may  be 
wasteful. 
One encounters in this context, though, another notion of  equity that  is 
focused less on the U.S. taxpayer per se and more on the obligations of a tax 
jurisdiction toward  the  other members  of  the community of  jurisdictions. 
This  “international”  equity  principle  is  that  each  jurisdiction  has  an 
obligation to provide relief from double taxation up to the level of tax that 
would be levied on a taxpayer with purely domestic-source income. If  we 
think of equity in terms of outcomes for individuals, the international equity 
principle seems a rather odd precept. But it is different from the intranational 
equity principle. For  example,  the international equity principle would  be 
satisfied by  exempting foreign-source income from domestic tax, provided 
the basic premise holds-that  income is an exogenous attribute of taxpayers. 
Even more than the intranational equity principle,  the international equity 
principle  suffers  in  implementation  from  its  definition  in  terms  that  are 
purely institutional rather than more fundamentally in terms of outcomes or 
even alternatives for individuals. For the latter purposes, it is not important 
whether something is taxed more than once or whether the burden is imposed 
by  an  income or by  a  sales tax.  All  the  same,  it  is  significant  that  the 
international  principle  carries  with  it  a  notion  of  obligations  of  good 
jurisdictional  citizenship that  is  missing  altogether from  the  intranational 
equity principle. 
There is a further justification for the foreign tax credit suggested by  the 
view of the corporate tax as a substitute for accrual accounting for income at 
the  individual  shareholder  level.  If  the  basic  function  of  the  “double 
taxation” of corporate income is to impose single taxation on the income of 
shareholders, something like the foreign tax  credit is clearly necessary  to 
dilute the strong incentive that would otherwise arise for individuals to hold 
shares directly rather than indirectly via U.S.  corporations. If the nationality 
of  the controlling corporation is a matter of  indifference, such a policy as 
substituting a deduction for the credit would presumably result in  significant 
shifts in portfolio form, little extra revenue, and the economic value loss that 
would result from inhibiting direct control. 
Rather  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  implications  of  confining 
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legal and institutional rather than economic. That is, the allowable credit is 
not determined by asking whether the incidence or other economic effect of 
the foreign tax or other policy  is like that of the U.S. income tax.  Instead, 
implementation  depends  on  the  foreign  tax  having  various  institutional 
features that make it look like the  U.S.  income tax (a VAT  of the  income 
type,  for example, would not be creditable).  As a result,  it would be quite 
possible  for  a  foreign  government  that  desired  to  do  so  to  implement 
simultaneously a capital subsidy and a formal income tax in such a way that 
the  tax  is  “paid”  by  the  U.S. government  (through  the  credit)  while  the 
effective tax burden on investment is zero.  U.S. law disallows the credit in 
cases  where  there  is  a direct  connection  between  a  subsidy received  by  a 
company  and  its  tax  obligations.  It  would  not  be  difficult,  however,  to 
circumvent this rule (Gersovitz  1987). 
So far we have not commented  in detail on another important feature of 
U.S. law with respect to the crediting of foreign taxes, namely, the limitation 
of the credit, in effect, to the amount that would have been collected on the 
same income  under  U.S.  law.  The logic  of  the  foreign  tax  credit  as  an 
intranational equity-based adjustment in a corporation’s U.S. liability would 
imply  no  such  limitation.  Nor  would  the  efficiency-oriented  principle  of 
capital-export neutrality.  A more obvious justification has to do not with the 
behavior  or burdens of taxpayers but  with the behavior of governments.  A 
country  that  is  host  to  a  large  amount  of  activity  owned  by  a  U.S. 
corporation could obviously impose a tax at a virtually unlimited rate if  the 
difference between  its  tax and the U.S. tax on the  same income would be 
paid  by  the  U.S. Treasury. Naturally,  this  reasoning  is not confined  to the 
issue of  crediting foreign taxes in excess of  U.S. rates. It applies as well to 
crediting taxes up to U.S. rates. Canadian tax policy  analysts, for example, 
regard  the Canadian corporate tax primarily  as an instrument for absorbing 
the U.S.  tax credit. 
It is difficult to exaggerate the complexity that has been introduced to the 
U.S.  rules  by  the  need  to  limit  the  foreign  tax  credit.  The  present 
international tax rate constellation, in which a large number of U.S. taxpayer 
corporations find themselves with excess credits, sets up strong pressures on 
governments. Those with tax rates in excess of that in the United States, still 
an  extremely  important source  of  direct  investment,  will  find  themselves 
under pressure to reduce rates to the U.S. level. The stock of excess credits, 
though,  will  imply  additional  pressure  for some countries  to reduce  rates 
below  the  U.S.  level.  Ironically,  the  foreign  tax  credit  will  become 
increasingly a source of capital-export  nonneutrality, as firms find opportu- 
nities  in low-tax jurisdictions  artificially  enhanced  by  the  option  that  they 
provide to use up excess credits on the U.S. tax books. 
1.8.4  International Taxation as Conditioned on Control 
In the literature on international income taxation, most attention has been 
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individual  or firm  to  locate  capital.  Here,  too, though, there  has  perhaps 
been  too little focus  on the actual transactions  taxed,  which  are not  flows 
of  income  in  the  abstract  but  dividend,  royality,  interest,  and  other 
“payments”  (perhaps  just  on  the  books),  and  on  the  distinctions  that 
influence the amount of  tax (e.g., the distinction between a portfolio  and a 
controlling investor). 
One  of  the  more  elusive  aspects  of  the  rules  for  taxing  international 
business  is  their  reliance  on  discrimination  among  degrees  of  control  of 
activities  camed  on  abroad.  Thus,  the  deemed-paid  credit  for  foreign 
corporate  income  taxes  is entirely  denied  to corporate  portfolio investors, 
that is, corporate shareholders owning  an insignificant  fraction of  the stock 
of the foreign company. To qualify, the U.S. corporation must own at least 10 
percent  of  the  voting  stock.  Even  at this  level  of  control,  the  foreign  tax 
credit is limited according to the various “baskets”  of income types, foreign 
company by foreign company. When the level of control rises to the level of 
a CFC, the foreign tax limits are determined by aggregates of foreign income 
by  type.  (Reminder:  a  CFC  is  a  foreign  corporation  in  which  U.S. 
shareholders owning at least  10 percent of  the voting stock together own at 
least 50 percent of  the voting stock.) 
The most obvious manifestation of  the importance placed  by the tax law 
on control of a foreign business activity is the distinction between active and 
passive income (in its various forms). The distinction (which is found in the 
purely  domestic  tax  sphere  as  well)  has  no  place  in  the  SHS  income 
conception,  nor is it readily modeled in the usual capital flow model (of the 
sort outlined  earlier  in  connection  with  the  problem  of  international  tax 
harmonization). Yet control and taxes are the two most obvious bases for the 
existence of multinational corporations. 
We  have  discussed  at  length  the  traditional  concept  of  capital-export 
neutrality,  which  (among  other  things)  can  at  least  be  understood  in  the 
context  of  conventional  capital  flow  models.  Introducing  the  notion  of 
control  as  an  economic  phenomenon  provides  a  context  for  mentioning 
another traditional neutrality  concept.  “Capital-import  neutrality”  refers to 
the nationality of ownership of firms.49  It obtains when there is no tax-based 
difference  in  circumstances  of  firms  operating  within  a  given  country 
associated  with  the  nationality  of  the  firm’s owners. The U.S.  policy  of 
defemng  income  tax  on  the  earnings  of  foreign  subsidiaries  (thereby 
subjecting those earnings to the local tax system alone, until repatriation) can 
be thought of as applying the standard of capital-import neutrality to retained 
foreign earnings.  (Arguably, the U.S. tax that will be due on repatriation is 
an unavoidable  toll charge that has  no influence  on the  foreign  investment 
decision [Hartman 19841.) The usual models of international capital flows do 
not  allow  one  to  address  the  justification  for  capital-import  neutrality 
effectively.  The  nationality  of  the  owners  of  capital  is  not  generally 
associated with economically significant consequences (apart, perhaps, from 
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The study  of control  promises to be  an interesting one. In particular,  it 
appears  to  be  the  obvious  place  to  bring  the  notion  of  international 
competitiveness into the analysis in a meaningful way, one different from a 
mere  identification  with  capital  importation.  (See,  e.g.,  Summers  1986.) 
Control is, however,  not easily given a rigorous economic  interpretation- 
note,  for example, that the  extent of  control of  the corporate  sector of  an 
economy  can  range  from  0  to  100  percent  according  to  the  degree  of 
portfolio diversification  by shareholders. 
1.9  Concluding Comments 
The conventional  analysis of the broad economic principles traditionally 
said to underlie  the  basic  structure  of  the  U.S.  system  for taxing  foreign 
income is fairly straightforward.  A system of worldwide taxation combined 
with a foreign tax credit for taxes paid  to other governments  is asserted  to 
achieve  capital-export  neutrality  and  the  most  efficient  international 
allocation of investment.  From the perspective of  the domestic investor, the 
choice  at the margin  between  foreign  and  domestic  investment  should  be 
unaffected  by  tax  considerations  and  should  respond  to  the  international 
levels  of  before-tax  rates  of  return.  This  system  will  create  an efficient 
worldwide allocation of resources and maximize world welfare. At the same 
time,  some  assert that  national  welfare  will  also be maximized  when  the 
overall effects of  foreign investment are taken into account. 
Although  this  theoretical  analysis  is  relatively  straightforward,  as  the 
preceding  sections  have  shown,  the  implementation  of  these  general 
principles  in  the  real  world  of  tax  rules  is  enormously  complex  and  the 
results  often  inconsistent.  Some of  the  sources  of  this  complexity  can be 
identified relatively  easily.  In the first place,  capital-export  neutrality  under 
the current system is present only when the U.S. tax rate exceeds the foreign 
rate.  When  the  foreign  rate  of  tax  exceeds  the  U.S.  rate,  the  theory  of 
capital-export neutrality in principle would require the United States to credit 
the  taxes  against  the  U.S.  taxes  paid  on  U.S.-source  income  and,  if 
necessary,  refund  the  excess. If  this  step is not  taken, then  investment  is 
discouraged  in countries  with  rates  of  tax  higher  than  that  of  the  United 
States.  In view  of the revenue cost of  such a policy,  however, particularly 
when the possible reactions of  foreign governments are taken into account, 
the  credit  has  historically  been  limited  to the  U.S.  taxes  attributable  to 
foreign-source income, though the form of the limitation has varied over the 
years. The failure to refund  excess foreign taxes was less significant before 
1986 since most  companies  then  could  fully  use their  foreign  tax  credits. 
Now, however, the majority of firms are in an excess credit position, and the 
limitations  on  the  availability  of  the  credit  have  led  to  much  of  the 
complexity of the legal rules. 
More  important, perhaps, the  present  form of  the  limitation  has  led  to 
significant  “second-best’’  issues.  For  example,  under  the  current  rules, 41  U.S. Taxation of International Income 
averaging of foreign taxes is allowed for active business income. This means 
that a U.S. company that is currently paying high foreign taxes with respect 
to one active business investment is encouraged at the margin to undertake a 
new  business investment in  a  low-tax foreign country rather than  in  the 
United States. The excess credits on the high-tax  investment can in effect 
shelter  all  (or  at  least  some)  of  the  U.S.  tax  burden  on  the  low-tax 
investment. In the extreme case where the foreign country does not tax the 
investment  at  all-for  example,  under  a  tax  holiday-the  U.S.  firm  is 
comparing the  before-tax rate  of  return  in  the  foreign  country  with  the 
after-tax rate  of  return  on  a  domestic  investment.  Thus,  an  imperfectly 
pursued  policy  of  capital-export neutrality can lead  to  results exactly the 
opposite of those the policy was intended to achieve. 
Similar issues arise with respect to the taxation of income earned though 
U.S .-controlled  foreign  subsidiaries.  A  fully  implemented  policy  of 
capital-export  neutrality  would  tax  the  subsidiary  income  to  the  U.S. 
shareholder as it accrues. On the other hand, a fully implemented policy of 
capital-import  or  competitive  neutrality  would  lead  to  the  complete 
exemption of  foreign income. Historically, Congress has accepted business 
arguments  that  current  U.S.  taxation  adversely  affects  the  competitive 
position of U.S. companies in foreign markets. It has allowed the deferral of 
U.S. tax on subsidiary income until  repatriation, but only as long as that 
income fell into certain categories. On repatriation, capital-export consider- 
ations reassert themselves, and the income is then taxed, with the allowance 
of  the  “deemed”  foreign  tax  credit  for  the  foreign  taxes  paid  by  the 
subsidiary.  This  “hybrid”  mixture  of  capital-import  and  capital-export 
considerations  again  has  led  to  the  complex  dividing  lines  required  by 
Subpart F to sort out income into deferral and accrual categories as well as 
the convoluted “pass through”  of baskets for foreign-tax-credit purposes. 
Another perspective from which to view the international rules is taxpayer 
equity.  How  should traditional notions of  horizontal equity be  applied in 
connection with  foreign income? The exemption of  foreign-source income 
would clearly seem inconsistent with any equity criterion based on ability to 
pay  or  well-being,  assuming  that  income  is  taken  to  be  an  exogenous 
characteristic of  taxpayers.  An  SHS approach to  income definition would 
seem to imply inclusion of foreign income and a deduction for foreign taxes 
as a cost of producing income. 
On  the other hand,  many  have  argued that a credit for foreign taxes is 
required  by  what  we  have  called international equity considerations. The 
U.S.  taxpayer who  is  subject to  tax  both  here,  because of  a domiciliary 
connection, and in the foreign jurisdiction where the income arises is, some 
assert, not similarly situated when compared with a U.S. taxpayer who has 
income  only  from  U.S.  sources.  The  United  States  as  the  country  of 
domicile  has  an  internationally  recognized  responsibility  to  relieve  the 
burden of  international double taxation arising because of  the overlapping 
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Having chosen initially to tax foreign-source  income, the United States has 
an  accompanying responsibility  based on  equity considerations to  relieve 
double taxation through the credit. 
On  the  other hand,  if  the  responsibility  of  the  domiciliary  country  to 
relieve international double taxation is recognized, a foreign tax credit is not 
the only means available. An alternative would be a “territorial”  system that 
left out of account both foreign income and foreign taxes. Such an approach, 
in  turn,  would  lead  back  to  the  question  of  the  relative  merits  of 
capital-export  and capital-import neutrality and reintroduce the appropriate- 
ness from an equity perspective of eliminating from the tax base a receipt 
that clearly would be included under traditional income notions. 
In  short, as in so many other tax policy  issues, the possible theoretical 
starting points for analysis in the international  area lead to quite different 
results, and the real-world phenomena are often “noisy”  and inconsistent with 
any single overarching approach. The most important task for policy analysis 
at this point is to try to determine with more accuracy exactly what effect the 
complex system of rules has on the form and extent of international activity. 
Notes 
1. For a fuller exposition of the applicable U.S. tax law, see McDaniel and Ault 
(1981). For the details of the Tax Reform Act of  1986, see U.S. Congress (1987) and 
U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1987). 
2.  The  Internal  Revenue  Code  provides  a  series  of  mechanical  rules  for 
determining  residence  of  aliens;  see  sec.  7701(b).  Special  rules  exempt  certain 
amounts of earned income received by  citizens residing abroad; see sec. 91  1. 
3. The Subpart F rules are described in more detail in sec.  1.2.1 below. 
4.  The foreign tax credit mechanism is discussed in more detail in sec. I .2.2 below. 
5. The U.S.  shareholder must be a corporation and must own at least 10 percent of 
the voting stock of the foreign corporation. The deemed-paid credit  is also available 
for taxes paid by lower-tier foreign subsidiaries under certain conditions as income is 
distributed up a chain of foreign corporations to the U.S. shareholder. 
6. That is, the credit is limited to foreign taxes on income that is determined by 
the United States to be from a foreign source. If a foreign country imposed a tax on 
an item of income that under the U.S. source rules is determined to be U.S.  source, 
the  credit  is  in effect  not  available  (unless there  are other  items of  income  from 
foreign sources that create excess limitation; see the discussion in sec. 1.2.2). 
7.  More technically, if there is no independently determined factory price, half the 
income is allocated to the location of the assets used in the production and sale and 
half to the place of  sale. In practice,  this means that, if  property is manufactured in 
the United States and sold abroad with no sales assets located abroad, half the income 
is foreign source even though it is unlikely that any foreign jurisdiction  will tax it 
(Treasury Regulations, sec  1.836-3(b)). 
8.  Treasury Regulations,  sec. 904(g). 
9.  Such dividends are not subject to tax when received by  nonresident aliens or 
foreign corporations if the dividend-paying corporation is subject to the branch profits 
tax discussed in sec.  1.3.4 below. 43  U.S. Taxation of International Income 
10. The determination of  where an intangible is used is obviously not always easy. 
11.  See Bank of America v.  U.S.,  680 F.2d 142 (Ct. Cls.  1982). 
12. Treasury  Regulations,  secs.  864(e),  1.861-9T.  Special  rules  apply  for  the 
allocation of  the interest expense of  a foreign corporation with a U.S. branch that in 
effect try to take into account the relation between interest rates and exchange rate 
gain or loss (Treasury Regulations,  sec. 1.882-5). 
13. See the discussion in sec. 1.2.2. 
14. The  regulations  originally  provided  that  30  percent  of  research  and 
development costs would be allocated to the place in which more than 50 percent of 
the research costs were incurred. Congress enacted a moratorium on the application 
of the regulation and allocated all research and development expenses incurred in the 
United States to U.S.-source income. For 1987, 50 percent (rather than 30 percent) 
allocation was established  by  the  1986 Act and subsequently modified.  Additional 
legislative action is anticipated. 
15. For the branch operations described above, the translation rate is the average 
exchange rate for the year. Calculation of income under this so-called profit and loss 
method  means  that  unrealized  foreign-exchange  gains  or  losses  in  the  taxpayer’s 
invested capital are not taken into account currently. Special rules apply to taxpayers 
who do business in “hyperinflationary  economies,”  which in effect allow changes in 
the dollar value of invested capital to be accounted for currently. 
In the case of  a distribution of income from a foreign subsidiary that has a foreign 
currency as its functional currency, the translation rate is the spot rate in effect at the 
time of the distribution. 
16. Appropriate adjustments are made if  there is a difference between the amount 
accrued and the amount actually paid. 
17. The legislative history of  the  1986 Act recognizes  the economic connection 
between exchange gain and interest income. 
18. If  the  losses  reduce  U.S. income,  i.e.,  if  there is  an  overall  foreign  loss, 
adjustments  are  later  required  in  the  foreign-tax-credit  fraction  to  limit  the 
creditability of foreign taxes on an operation that, from the U.S. perspective, has not 
generated any net income. 
19. Subject to the limitations of Subpart F discussed in sec.  1.3.2. 
20.  The  rules  apply  to  any  foreign  corporation  in  which  “U.S. persons”  own 
more than 50 percent of the voting power or value of the outstanding  stock of  the 
corporation.  A  “U.S.  person”  is defined as a U.S. individual  or corporation  that 
owns 10 percent or more of the voting stock of the foreign corporation. 
21.  The  regulations  have  extensive  rules  defining  the  types  of  activities  that 
constitute  manufacturing  as  contrasted  with  mere  assembly  and  packaging.  In 
addition, the income would not be taxed currently if it bore a rate of foreign tax that 
approximated the U.S. rate. 
22.  This makes the source rule discussed in sec.  1.1.3 extremely important. This 
rule  sources  income  from  sales  of  inventory  in  the jurisdiction  in  which  title  is 
passed. That rule makes it possible to create income that is technically foreign source 
but is unlikely to attract any foreign taxes. As a result, the foreign taxes on high-tax 
foreign-source income can become currently creditable. 
23.  A special rule applies to interest that is subject to a high withholding tax. Such 
interest  is  segregated  in  its own  basket  to prevent  averaging  with  other normally 
low-taxed passive income. 
24.  Technically, the DISC provisions were retained in a limited form, and an interest 
charge was imposed on the deferred tax liability. Thus, the taxpayer may still benefit 
from an indirect loan from the government at a potentially favorable rate of  interest. 
25.  Treasury Regulations, sec. 924(d)-(e). In fact, since the FSC can “contract out” 
the foreign activities to related parties, its actual foreign presence can be minimal. 44  Hugh J. AulVDavid F.  Bradford 
26.  See U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1984, 1042). The European 
27.  See, e.g., Eli Lilly v.  Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1984). 
28.  See Treasury Regulations,  sec. 936(h). 
29.  See U.S.  Treasury Department  (1984, 2:327-30).  The Treasury analysis of 
the  possessions  tax  credit  estimated  that  the  average  tax  benefit  for  corporations 
taking advantage of  the possessions tax credit was $22,000 per employee while the 
average employee wage was only $14,210. 
30.  Rental income from real property is in principle taxed at the 30 percent gross 
rate, but the foreign taxpayer can elect to have the income treated as business income 
so  that  deductions  such  as  depreciation,  taxes,  and  interest  are  available.  The 
resulting net income is taxed at normal U.S. rates. 
3  1. As indicated below, very often the 30 percent rate is eliminated or reduced by 
treaty,  and  several  important  categories  of  income  are  exempt.  Nonetheless,  the 
existence of the high withholding rate can be significant in some circumstances. 
32. The exemption for portfolio  interest was added in  1984. Certain formalities 
must be complied with to ensure that the portfolio debt will not be acquired by U.S. 
taxpayers.  Before  the exemption  in  1984, U.S. corporations  could  in effect  issue 
tax-exempt bonds to foreign lenders through a convoluted technique involving the use 
of  wholly  owned  finance  subsidiaries  organized  in  the  Netherlands  Antilles.  The 
transactions  took  advantage  of  a  tax  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Antilles. These structures originated in the  1970s with the blessing of  the Treasury 
Department  to encourage  U.S.  corporations  to  borrow  abroad  during  a period  of 
balance-of-payments difficulties. The direct exemption for portfolio interest has made 
them  obsolete,  and  the  treaty  on  which  they  were  originally  based  has  been 
terminated. 
Community has “raised questions”  about the FSC provisions under GATT. 
33.  See the discussion in sec. 1.3.4 below. 
34.  Although a sale of the shares would result in no current U.S. tax, presumably 
a purchaser would discount the purchase price for the shares to reflect the fact that it 
could  get  a  stepped-up  basis  in  the  underlying  assets  of  the  corporation  only  by 
paying  the  corporate-level  tax.  Thus, the  two  methods  of  disposition  would  have 
roughly the same after-tax consequences to the seller. 
35.  H. Rep. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (1985), 425. 
36.  The branch profits tax is only a surrogate for the tax on a dividend distribution 
to the foreign shareholder, but it technically falls on the foreign corporation, and thus 
the nondiscrimination clause is applicable. 
37.  A foreign corporation is deemed to be treaty shopping if more than 50 percent 
of its stock is owned by non-treaty  country residents, with an exception for publicly 
traded corporations. 
38.  For an overview of the economics of international income taxation, see Adam 
and Whalley (1977), Sat0 and Bird (1975). 
39.  Grubert and Mutti (1987) present an analysis of  the economic effects of  the 
1986 changes. 
40.  For a clear development of this point, see Bittker (1980). 
41.  In his elegantly clear exposition of tax policy in open economies, Dixit (1985) 
makes no mention at all of income taxes. For promising beginnings at integration of 
the two subjects, see the papers by  Frenkel,  Razin, and Symansky and by Gordon 
and Levinsohn in this volume. 
42.  For an extended discussion of income concepts and references to the literature, 
see Bradford (1986) or Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978). 
43.  Within  the  United  States,  income  is  typically  allocated  to  different  juris- 
dictions by  formula.  Formula apportionment  solves  some problems  but  introduces 
others. See Gordon and Wilson (1986). 45  U.S. Taxation of International Income 
44. Newlon’s  (1987)  analysis  of  the taxation  of  multinationals  provides  a  nice 
illustration  of  the  importance  of  looking  closely  at  the  rules  relating  to  specific 
transactions (such as payment of interest). 
45. For a model that takes into account the imperfect substitutability of  assets in 
different countries in investor portfolios, see Mutti and Grubert (1985). 
46.  This  conclusion has  long  been recognized.  See, e.g.,  Richman  (1963) and 
Musgrave (1969). Feldstein and Hartman (1979) present a formal analysis. 
47. For a forceful statement of this viewpoint,  see Ross (1985). 
48.  For an analysis of tax policy determination as an international noncooperative 
game, see Gordon and Varian (1986). 
49. Hufbauer  and  Foster  summed  up  the  law  in  1976  as  follows:  “Both  in 
legislation and in bilateral tax treaties, the United States has attempted to ensure the 
type of neutrality appropriate to different situations, while at the same time protecting 
U.S. tax revenue. Thus, United States taxation of the foreign income of U.S. owned 
firms embodies a mixture of capital-export neutrality, capital-import  neutrality, and 
revenue protection clauses”  (1976,  15). 
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Comment  Daniel J. Frisch 
Tax  policy  debates  generally  take  place  on two  levels.  One concerns the 
broad  outlines of  tax  structure; an example  is the debate over full  versus 
partial  taxation  of  capital  gains.  This  level  considers  the  equity  and 
efficiency  effects of  taxation  and, at  its best,  is based  on  solid economic 
analysis. The second level takes the basic structure as given and debates how 
it should be applied to the myriad real-world  situations in which taxpayers 
find  or  put  themselves.  For  example,  special  treatment  for capital  gains 
spawned a vast and complex set  of  tax code provisions  that defined capital 
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gains and limited the types of income eligible for the preferential treatment. 
This type of debate does not typically involve economists; indeed, they are 
often completely unaware of it. Instead, it is usually left to lawyers. 
This  dichotomy  is  a  healthy  one.  If  economists,  especially  academic 
economists, wished to influence the second type of debate, they would have 
to incur a substantial investment to learn about all the line drawing and rule 
making  that  has  gone  on in  the  past.  Economists  and  lawyers  are nearly 
unanimous in agreeing that it would not be worthwhile for the former to do 
so. Further, it seems clear that those good at the detailed type of  tax policy 
often have difficulty recalling  fundamental objectives and developing fresh 
approaches for achieving them. In short, it is efficient for some analysts to 
specialize  in  the  broad  policy  concerns  and  others  to  specialize  in  the 
detailed aspects of implementation. 
A  major  problem  for  international  tax  policy  is  that  this  kind  of 
specialization  has withered away during the last decade or so. The current 
generation of tax policy economists, with a few exceptions, seems to have 
decided that,  because learning all the detailed rules would be so  costly, it 
should  refrain  from  commenting  on  the  field  at  all.  This  conclusion  is 
incorrect  and  has  led  to a  situation  in  which  no one examines  the  basic 
principles.  This conference will represent a major contribution, therefore, if 
it  inspires  a  greater number of  economists to address  the  basic  issues  in 
international tax policy. 
The paper by Hugh J. Ault and David F. Bradford is a perfect one to start 
off  a conference designed  to achieve this goal. It  surveys the  current tax 
rules  in  an  admirably  clear  and  concise  fashion  and  speculates  on  the 
economic principles on which they are and should be based. I will comment 
on each of these sections in turn. 
Current U.S. Tax Rules 
The survey of current rules that constitutes the first half of the paper (secs. 
1.1 -  1.4) is a significant achievement. In a remarkably short span, it outlines 
all important aspects of current U.S. rules for taxing international activities. 
It starts from first principles, outlining who is subject to U.S. tax, what part 
of  their income is taxed,  and how double taxation  is avoided.  Despite this 
starting point, it encompasses all the rules,  at least all U.S. rules, that any 
policy analyst needs to know. As is mentioned above, economists may have 
shied  away  from  the  field  partly  out  of  fear  that  they  may  inadvertently 
neglect  some  crucial  tax  detail  that  would  undercut  their  analysis.  This 
survey can cure this fear; after reading it carefully, economists will not have 
this reason,  or excuse,  for avoiding international  tax  policy  questions any 
longer. 
The survey would have been even more valuable, however,  had it given 
some indication  as to  the  relative  importance  of  the  tax  issues  described. 
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concentrate and in identifying the ones most likely to have large effects on 
economic activities. One way of providing this information would have been 
to discuss the available empirical evidence, including IRS statistics, revenue 
estimates that  accompany tax  legislation, the tax  expenditure budget, and 
certain other Treasury Department publications. 
For example, IRS statistics show that U.S. withholding taxes on interest, 
dividends,  and  royalties paid  to  foreign  investors raise  remarkably  little 
revenue.  This fact  may  cast  some  doubt  on  the  importance of  an  issue 
mentioned several times in the paper, that the general withholding tax rate 
was not lowered from 30 percent when the Tax Reform Act reduced all other 
rates.  (The reason  why  this  issue is  unimportant empirically  is  that  the 
general rate applies only when  a treaty is not present, and the vast majority 
of  investment comes from or through treaty countries.) Revenue estimates 
could have been used in a similar fashion to reflect on the importance of the 
“branch tax”  instituted in  1986. The revenue estimates accompanying the 
Tax  Reform Act  of  1986 indicate that this change is an exceedingly minor 
one empirically; it was estimated to raise only about $25 million a year. (See 
U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation [  1987, 10471. Reasons include 
that  very  little  foreign  investment  in  the  United  States  occurs  through 
branches and that treaties reduce or eliminate the tax for investors from most 
important countries.) 
Another example concerns the subsidies for exports provided through the 
tax code. The survey mentions the special source rule for sales of “inventory 
property”  and even (in n.  22) stresses its importance. Later, in  a section 
describing subsidy provisions, the paper outlines the FSC (formerly DISC) 
provision that partially exempts income from exports. However, the survey 
neglects to point out that the former is a much more powerful incentive for 
exports than  the  latter.  The tax  expenditure numbers included in  Special 
Analysis G of  each year’s Budget of  the  U.S. Government show that the 
sales source rule is the largest tax expenditure in the international area by  far 
and is estimated to cost $2.9 billion for fiscal year 1989; the FSC provison is 
estimated to cost only $425 million. Finally, one should note that the paper 
does not  completely neglect empirical evidence; note 29  uses a Treasury 
Department report to present an intriguing statistic on the efficiency of  the 
other subsidy provision described, the “section 936” incentive for operating 
in Puerto Rico. 
Economic Principles 
The second half of  the paper (secs. 1.5-1.9)  sets an ambitious goal for 
itself, to  describe and  criticize the  economic principles that  underlie  the 
current system of  tax rules. Perhaps because the goal is so ambitious, this 
section is  more than  a little discursive; it  presents aspects of  each of  its 
arguments in several different places.  Therefore, it may  be  worthwhile to 
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in the paper. It seems to me that the section seeks to point out four types of 
problems with current analyses of  international tax policy issues. 
First,  equity  considerations  have  dominated  international  tax  policy 
decision making, according to the paper. For  example, the main argument 
for taxing worldwide income is that not doing so would violate horizontal 
equity. The decision to provide a foreign tax credit is more complicated, but 
“intranational equity”  and  “international equity” considerations are stressed. 
The problem is that, because international tax policy questions involve taxation 
of corporations or, more generally, return to capital, it makes very little sense to 
consider equity in  this field. If the tax  system is  “unfair”  to one particular 
channel for earning a retum to capital, the amount invested in it will fall, but the 
properly measured  net  rate  of  return  generally will  not  change. Thus,  the 
relative position of individual investors, in equilibrium, will not be.  affected by 
“inequitable” taxation of corporations or other investment opportunities. 
The  second  problem  is  that  income,  specifically  the  “Schanz-Haig- 
Simon” (SHS) concept, is a bad basis for tax policy. Actual taxation must be 
based on observable transactions, and it is exceedingly difficult to coax a 
measure of SHS income from them. Further, the SHS concept does not seem 
to answer several important international tax policy questions, including the 
fundamental one of  whether specific items of  income should be treated as 
foreign or domestic source. 
The third  problem  has  been  described by  Slemrod  and  others (as the 
paper  acknowledges).  Because  tax  systems  vary,  investors  in  various 
countries  may  face  different  after-tax  rates  of  return  on  similar 
investments, yet we  do not observe the specialization that should occur. It 
is  very  hard  to construct a satisfactory economic foundation for a  set of 
rules  that,  in  their  current  form,  should  be  causing  serious  arbitrage 
problems. There is a danger that economists’ policy recommendations will 
end up sounding like, “The rules must be changed right away so that they 
are in a form that we can analyze.” 
The fourth problem is that we  have been too narrow in  our view of  the 
ways in which income is earned abroad. Traditional models consider only 
the  allocation of  a homogenous K,  capital,  amoung countries. However, 
investors have lots of  choices when deciding where and how to locate their 
capital. For  example, U.S. investors who want to own capital abroad can 
buy  shares  in  a  U.S.  corporation  that  has  a  foreign  branch,  a  U.S. 
corporation with  a foreign subsidiary corporation, or directly in  a foreign 
corporation. A key distinction is that, in the first two alternatives, a U.S. 
corporation controls the foreign activities, but no U.S. investor has control 
in  the  third.  Further, the  U.S.  tax  system treats these  investments very 
differently  in  several  respects.  The  authors  wonder  whether  control  is 
important and, if so, how it should affect tax policy decisions. For example, 
it may be that repeal of “deferral”  would cause U.S. investors to substitute 
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direct investment. If so, the revenue and other effects of this response should 
be considered. 
Each of these four themes has a great deal of truth in it; however, I am not 
sure that they lead to the formulation of a better set of economic principles. 
For  example,  I  agree  with  the  first  conclusion,  that  equity  is  basically 
irrelevant  to  international  tax policy.  However,  I did  not  find the premise 
convincing.  Although  they  may  mention  equity  considerations,  most 
traditional analyses do not spend much time on them. Instead, they depend 
much  more heavily on concepts such as capital-export neutrality, national 
neutrality,  and  capital-import neutrality.  These terms  all claim to  address 
efficiency  issues;  indeed,  even  the  more  modem  (though  hardly  more 
satisfactory) concept of  international  competitiveness claims to address the 
problem of maximizing the United States’ economic effectiveness and thus 
falls  within  the  efficiency  concern.  In  fact,  a  brief  (i.e.,  introspective) 
literature search turned up only one analysis of international tax policy that 
turns  on equity  questions (Vogel  1988). Note that the  authors do not  cite 
even  this  many  analyses  of  international  taxation  in  which  equity 
considerations are crucial. 
The second theme, that income is a faulty basis for taxation, also seems to 
miss the  point  to some degree.  Many  participants  in  the  conference  and 
readers of  these words would have no trouble  agreeing that,  as one of the 
authors  has persuasively  argued  on many  occasions,  a consumption-based 
tax may be preferable. However, I do not see how this conclusion forces one 
to decide that an income tax can never treat international income in a rational 
or consistent fashion. For example, just because neither Schanz, Haig, nor 
Simon considered the issue of  the source of  income does not imply that it 
cannot be  studied.  A  well-specified  model  should  be  able to analyze the 
incentive  effects  of  current  source  rules  and  indicate  their  effects  on 
efficiency  and  welfare.  If  so,  it  may  yield  a  consistent  and  valuable 
foundation for source rules; at least, the paper did not convince me that such 
an analysis is not worth a try. 
The third theme  is the  existence of  arbitrage opportunities  and  lack of 
equilibrium that  should exist under  current  tax rules.  This problem  is not 
unique to international taxation. As Stiglitz (e.g., 1983) has pointed out, the 
voluntary  nature  of  realizations  causes  a  similar problem  in  capital  gains 
taxation.  His  conclusions may  apply  here,  too.  If  arbitrage  opportunities 
continue to exist, there must be imperfections in international capital markets 
or tax rules that prevent their exploitation. Further, these imperfections and 
rules  must  be  key  aspects  of  the  markets,  and  analyses  of  the  effects of 
taxation should incorporate them. 
The final theme is the need to differentiate between types of investments 
that confer control and those that do not. A U.S. multinational corporation’s 
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investor’s decision to add foreign securities to his or her portfolio.  These 
decisions will  involve different considerations and  tradeoffs,  and  taxation 
will probably affect them in different ways. Therefore, it may be important 
to  differentiate  between  foreign  direct  investment  income  and  foreign 
portfolio income in tax policy analysis. 
I am  not sure, however, how  useful it is to analyze these activities as if 
they were close substitutes. It is not obvious to me that a tax change that 
disadvantaged foreign direct investment would cause it to disappear rapidly, 
along  with  an equal rise in  foreign portfolio  investment. The  size of  the 
cross-elasticity is  an  empirical  question,  of  course;  however,  until  it  is 
measured, there are strong reasons why it may be better to assume it is much 
closer to zero than infinity. Internationl trade economists have long known 
that  the existence of  multinational corporations has  very  little to  do with 
access to  capital or other factor-based comparative advantages (see,  e.g., 
Caves  1982, chap.  2).  Instead,  they  exist  for  “industrial  organization” 
reasons;  for  example,  large  corporations  have  advantages  in  certain 
activities, such as R&D-intensive industries, where large fixed costs must be 
incurred.  Evidence  to  support  this  view  includes  the  fact  that  many 
multinationals raise capital,  along with other factors of  production,  in  the 
local market. This implies that U.S.  multinationals may not be affected one 
way  or the other if  the U.S.  taxed international capital flows more heavily. 
This  view  also  seems  to  predict  that  U.S.  participation  in  “pure” 
international capital markets may be relatively unaffected by  a system that 
taxed U.S. multinationals more heavily, such as one that contained a repeal 
of  deferral. 
Despite this conclusion, I feel that the authors’ observation that  foreign 
direct investment income and foreign portfolio  income are fundamentally 
different is the most important point  in the second half  of  the paper. This 
observation indicates to me that tax policy analyses should examine them as 
distinct activities. Principles that apply to one probably do not apply to the 
other. Specifically, traditional analyses that concentrate on net rates of return 
and allocation of  capital may be relevant for tax policy toward international 
portfolio  investment,  but  they  may  have  little  to  do  with  multinationals’ 
activities. Instead, a new  type of  analysis may be necessary to identify the 
proper economic principles for taxation of multinationals’ overseas income. 
Summary 
Ault and Bradford have provided us with a perfectly suited and extremely 
valuable first paper for this conference. It contains a survey of  current U.S. 
rules that is remarkably clear, complete, and concise. Tax policy economists 
need no longer fear that analysis of international issues must be preceded by 
a lengthy and painful initiation into tax law. The paper also make a number 
of  provocative comments on the economic weaknesses of  current rules and 52  Hugh J. AultlDavid F.  Bradford 
analyses but does not resolve these issues completely. Thus, the paper not 
only reduces the cost of  studying international tax issues but also increases 
the benefits by indicating some important questions in need of answers. 
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